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President Washington began his second term on March 4,
1793. Reluctant to run again, he had been persuaded that his
country needed him, and he had not been opposed. It has been
said, however, that in other respects the election of 1792 was our
first "partisan" election. A plan to displace Vice President John
Adams with New York Governor George Clinton attracted 50 of
the 127 electoral votes. Thomas Jefferson rejoiced that there was
now a "decided majority" for the "republican interest" in the
House.' Although it was still perhaps premature to attach firm
party labels to individual members of Congress, 2 a number of
observers have concluded that at least one chamber of the Third
Congress was in Republican hands.3
t Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
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See Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 289 (Oxford 1993);
James Roger Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis 53-
60 (Yale 1993).
2 See John C. Miller, The Federalist Era: 1789-1801 124 (Harper 1960) ("Even as late
as the Third Congress ... almost half the members of the House prided themselves upon
being free of party ties and obligations."). But see Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of
George Washington 106-08 (Kansas 1974) (arguing that partisanship was widespread).
' See, for example, Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism at 365 (cited in note 1)
(suggesting that the Republicans controlled both Houses). Most commentators seem to
agree that the Federalists still controlled the Senate, though by the narrowest of margins.
See, for example, Roy Swanstrom, The United States Senate, 1787-1801: A Dissertation on
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War had broken out in Europe early in 1793, and
Washington's first concern was to keep the United States out of
it. The first session of the Third Congress was dominated by
measures designed to prevent or prepare for war and the ways
and means of financing them. Congress enacted a neutrality law;
authorized the raising of additional troops, the construction of
forts and arsenals, and the establishment of a navy; laid an
embargo and a ban on arms exports; and debated discriminatory
tariffs, nonintercourse with Great Britain, sequestration of
British debts, and indemnity for depredations on our shipping.
Congress adopted new taxes on carriages, snuff, and sugar, and
conducted its first significant debate on the definition of direct
taxes.
The second session proceeded in the shadow of the Whiskey
Rebellion. Washington's actions in suppressing the uprising
created no constitutional controversy, but his clumsy attempt to
implicate the popular Democratic Societies in subversive activi-
ties triggered a major brouhaha over First Amendment freedoms.
It was the Third Congress that, after rejecting an interesting
and little known set of alterations, proposed what became the
Eleventh Amendment, limiting federal jurisdiction over suits
against states. At the same time, a revised naturalization act
gave federal judges new responsibilities that were hard to charac-
terize as judicial. Faced with an embarrassing lacuna in the
power to impeach, Congress took the easy way out by transfer-
ring the authority of an incompetent judge to another court. And
in seating a "Delegate" from the Southwest Territory the House
debated important questions concerning the nature of Congress
itself.
There was much partisan rancor and wasting of time. The
Senate was without a quorum for the first two weeks of the
second session, and the House haggled for five days over its reply
to the President's speech. Indeed, for a time there was consider-
able uncertainty whether the Third Congress would meet at all.
An outbreak of yellow fever in Philadelphia lasting into the
autumn of 1793 prompted Washington to ask several trusted
the First Fourteen Years of the Upper Legislative Body 283 (US GPO 1988); Thomas A.
Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison 146 (Virginia 1985). Having been de-
feated in a bid for reelection, Virginia's Alexander White lamented the hardening of party
lines: "I never could reconcile to my mind a maxim which politicians say is necessary in
the conduct of public affairs, that of going into all the measures of the Party whose gen-
eral object you approve." Letter from Alexander White to James Madison (Nov 30, 1793),
in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 145.
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advisers whether he had authority to move Congress's December
session to some safer location.4 Madison and Jefferson said no:
Article II, § 3, which empowered the President to convene Con-
gress on "extraordinary Occasions," authorized him to change
only the time, not the place, of congressional meetings.5 Fortu-
nately, the epidemic subsided in time to permit Congress to
assemble in Philadelphia as planned, and Congress avoided
future embarrassment by giving the President the authority the
Framers had arguably failed to provide.'
After admitting the public to the debate over Albert
Gallatin's qualifications,7 the Senate finally voted to open its
doors generally during the conduct of "Legislative" business, but
only after "suitable galleries" were built;' and it did not happen
during the Third Congress. Moreover, press coverage of House
proceedings was skimpier than ever before. Apart from the war
issues, there was rather little reported debate; much of the
Annals of Congress reads like the Senate Journal. But, as al-
" See Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Oct 14, 1793), in Mason, et
al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 127 (cited in note 3); Letter from George
Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Oct 14, 1793), in Harold C. Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 361 (Columbia 1969).
See Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Oct 24, 1793), in Mason, et
al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 129-31 (cited in note 3); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to George Washington (Oct 17, 1793), in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, 6 The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson 436 (Knickerbocker 1895). Even Hamilton, who argued convincingly
that "[the reason of the thing as well as the words of the Constitution" were as applicable
to the place as to the time of meeting ("The usual seat of the Government may be in
possession of an enemy-it may be swallowed up by an earthquake."), doubted that the
President could change the place without also changing the time. Letter from Alexander
Hamilton to George Washington (Oct 24, 1793), in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton at 373-74 (cited in note 4). Noting that some had even questioned
whether Congress itself could change a place of meeting it had once established,
Washington thought this "a strained construction of the Constitution." Letter from George
Washington to Edmund Randolph (Oct 14, 1793), in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 33 The
Writings of George Washington 125, 127 (US GPO 1940).
' See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov 2, 1793), in Mason, et al,
eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 133 (cited in note 3); Act of Apr 3, 1794, 1 Stat
353 (authorizing the President to alter the place of meeting if conditions at the appointed
spot were "hazardous to the lives or health of the members"). This provision was obviously
necessary and proper to the operations of Congress, and the authority it delegated was
confined by a narrow and meaningful standard. Thus it ought to have satisfied anyone but
the occasional diehard who refused to accept Congress's 1790 decision that it had power to
fix a temporary as well as a permanent seat of government, and it is still law. See Letter
from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Oct 28, 1793), in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The
Papers of James Madison at 132; David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substan-
tive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U Chi L Rev 775, 849 (1994); 2 USC § 27
(1988).
' 4 Annals of Cong 43 (Feb 11, 1794).
s 4 Annals of Cong 47 (Feb 20, 1794).
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ways, much of what the Third Congress did and said in the
debate about the constitutional issues that confronted it helps to
inform our understanding of the Constitution.9
I. NEUTRALITY
A. The Proclamation
In the spring of 1793, after the Second Congress had ad-
journed, news reached Philadelphia that the revolutionary
French government had declared war against Great Britain. On
April 22, President Washington issued his famous neutrality
proclamation.' °
"[Tihe duty and interest of the United States," wrote the
President, required that they "adopt and pursue a conduct friend-
ly and impartial toward the belligerent powers." He therefore
deemed it appropriate "to declare the disposition of the United
States" to act in a friendly and impartial manner, "and to warn
the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts and
proceedings whatsoever which may in any maimer tend to con-
travene such disposition." No citizen who offended the law of
nations by participating in hostilities or by delivering contraband
could count on our government for protection. Finally, said Wash-
ington, he had instructed the appropriate officers "to cause prose-
cutions to be instituted against all persons who shall, within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the law of
nations with respect to the powers at war, or any of them.""
The President's Cabinet had unanimously approved a decla-
ration along these lines, but Jefferson had expressed serious
misgivings along the way, some of which were of a constitutional
nature.' There followed an epic newspaper battle between
9 This article is the fourth in a series exploring debates and actions of the legislative
and executive branches that help to illuminate constitutional questions. For earlier
installments see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and
the Structure of Government: 1789-1791, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 161 (1995); Currie, 61
U Chi L Rev 775 (cited in note 6); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Sec-
ond Congress: 1791-1793, 90 Nw U L Rev (forthcoming 1996).
10 George Washington, Proclamation, in James D. Richardson, ed, 1 A Compilation of
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents: 1789-1897 156 (US Congress 1900). The story
is told concisely in Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism at 336-41 (cited in note 1),
and in Abraham D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins
103-16 (Ballinger 1976). For a more detailed account see Charles M. Thomas, American
Neutrality in 1793: A Study in Cabinet Government 13-52 (AMS 1967).
" George Washington, Proclamation, in Richardson, ed, 1 Messages and Papers at
156-57 (cited in note 10).
12 See Jefferson's memorandum of this meeting in John Catanzariti, et al, eds, 25 The
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Hamilton ("Pacificus") and Madison ("Helvidius") over the rela-
tive powers of the President and of Congress in the realm of
foreign affairs. 3
The principal objection to the proclamation was that, since
only Congress could declare war, only Congress could commit us
to peace. As Jefferson explained in a letter to Madison,
The [proclamation] as first proposed was to have been a
declaration of neutrality. It was opposed on th[e]
groun[d]... that a declaration of neutrality was a declara-
tion there should be no war, to which the Executive was not
competent."
In response to Jefferson's concerns, however, the word "neutrali-
ty" (which was "understood to respect the future") was omitted
from the proclamation. Thus, Hamilton was able to argue with
considerable force in his first Pacificus essay that the objection
lacked merit:
[The proclamation] only proclaims a fact with regard to the
existing state of the Nation, informs the citizens of what the
laws previously established require of them in that state, &
warns them that these laws will be put into execution
against [offenders]. 5
Congress remained "free to perform its own duties" as it saw
fit; 6 it could declare war or not, as it chose.
Hamilton's argument was powerful but not quite decisive, for
Washington had not stopped at declaring our present condition of
peace. Rather, he had proclaimed the "disposition" of the United
States to pursue a friendly and impartial policy in accordance
with his view of our "duty and interest." In a letter to Jefferson,
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 570 (Princeton 1992). See also Miller, Federalist Era at 128-29
(cited in note 2); Editorial Note, in Catanzariti, et al, eds, 25 The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson at 571.
'" These letters, which can be found in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton at 33-43, 55-63, 65-69, 82-86, 90-95, 100-06, 130-35 (cited in note 4), and Mason,
et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 66-73, 80-87, 95-103, 106-10, 113-20 (cited
in note 3) respectively, were also published together by J. and G.S. Gideon in 1845 under
the title The Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius (1845) with The Letters of Americanus
(Delmar 1976).
" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 23, 1793), in Mason, et al,
eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 37 (cited in note 3).
'" Pacificus No 1, in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 43
(cited in note 4).
" Id at 42.
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Madison took the position that in so doing Washington had gone
too far.' Speaking to the public as Helvidius, Madison toned
down his objection to avoid making it an attack on the popular
President, explaining why use of the unfortunate term "disposi-
tion" did not justify interpreting the proclamation to declare a
policy of peace:
Had the Proclamation prejudged the question on either side,
and proclaimed its decision to the world; the Legislature,
instead of being as free as it ought, might be thrown under
the dilemma, of either sacrificing its judgment to that of the
Executive; or by opposing the Executive judgment, of pro-
ducing a relation between the two departments, extremely
delicate among ourselves, and of the worst influence on the
national character and interest abroad... .8
Madison's concern should not be dismissed out of hand. In
the converse situation Washington and his Cabinet scrupulously
insisted on several early occasions that no one outside the execu-
tive branch communicate directly with foreign governments lest
the President be embarrassed in his conduct of foreign affairs. 9
' See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 13, 1793), in Mason, et
al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 29 (cited in note 3):
[A] proclamation on the subject could not properly go beyond a declaration of the fact
that the U.S. were at war or peace, and an enjunction of a suitable conduct on the
Citizens. The right to decide the question whether the duty & interest of the U.S. re-
quire war or peace under any given circumstances, and whether their disposition be
towards the one or the other seems to be essentially & exclusively involved in the
right vested in the Legislature, of declaring war in time of peace; and in the
P[resident] & S[enate] of making peace in time of war.
See also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 19, 1793), in Mason, et al,
eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 33 (arguing that the proclamation "seems to vio-
late the forms & spirit of the Constitution, by making the executive Magistrate the organ
of the disposition the duty & the interest of the Nation in relation to war & peace, sub-
jects appropriated to other departments of the Government").
"s Helvidius No 5, in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 113, 116
(cited in note 3).
" When the House exuberantly voiced its approval of the new French constitution in
1792, Washington expressed concern that "the legislature would be endeavoring to invade
the executive." Jefferson persuaded him not to protest, arguing that the House "had a
right, independently of legislation, to express sentiments on other subjects," so long as, in
the case of statements regarding foreign nations, "instead of a direct communication, they
should pass their sentiments through the President." See 3 Annals of Cong 100 (Mar 5,
1792); 3 Annals of Cong 106-07 (Mar 13, 1792); 3 Annals of Cong 456-57 (Mar 10, 1792);
Ana of Mar 12, 1792, in H.A. Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 110-12
(Riker, Thorne 1854); Editorial Note, in Charles T. Cullen, et al, eds, 23 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 221-22 (Princeton 1990).
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Moreover, Hamilton's argument that the President had merely
declared "the existing state of the Nation" seems not to have
been entirely candid. In a later meeting to discuss what Wash-
ington should say to Congress about the proclamation, Hamilton
was reported as saying that it had been intended as an expres-
sion of the President's opinion that war was contrary to our in-
terests and that the President had every right to express his
opinion."
However, Washington himself read the proclamation narrow-
ly. "The President," Jefferson reported, "declared he never had an
idea that he could bind Congress against declaring war, or that
anything contained in his proclamation could look beyond the
first day of their meeting." Sharing this interpretation, Jefferson
said he was satisfied that the proclamation did not interfere with
Congress's prerogatives: "I admitted the President, having re-
ceived the nation at the close of Congress in a state of peace, was
bound to preserve them in that state till Congress should meet
again, and might proclaim anything which went no farther."2'
When the House unanimously voted felicitations to France four years later on the
adoption of a new flag, the resolution respectfully requested the President to forward the
House's sentiments to the French authorities, and he did. See 5 Annals of Cong 195-200
(Jan 4, 1796); Letter from George Washington to the President of the Directory of the
French Republic (Jan 7, 1796), in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 34 The Writings of George
Washington at 419 (US GPO 1940). The Senate refused to go even that far, see 5 Annals
of Cong 28-36 (Jan 5-6, 1796), after Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut objected that
"[n]othing... could be found in the Constitution to authorize either branch of the Leg-
islature to keep up any kind of correspondence with a foreign nation." 5 Annals of Cong
32 (Jan 6, 1796). When Citizen Gendt brazenly persisted in addressing a French consul's
credentials to Congress rather than to the President, Jefferson returned them with the
curt reminder that the President was "the only channel of communication between this
country and foreign nations .... [Blound to enforce respect to the order of things estab-
lished by our Constitution, the President will issue no Exequatur to any consul or vice-
consul, not directed to him in the usual form.... ." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mr.
Genet (Nov 22, 1793), in HA. Washington, ed, 4 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 84-85
(Riker 1854), also reprinted in Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Claire Clarke, eds, 1
American State Papers (Foreign Relations) 184 (Gales & Seaton 1832); see Edward S.
Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957 208-09 (NYU 1957).
In 1799 Congress recognized this principle by making it a crime for private citizens
to negotiate with foreign governments without the President's consent. Logan Act, 1 Stat
613 (1799), codified at 18 USC § 953 (1988). See also the German Constitutional Court's
decision, on similar grounds, that individual states had no power to conduct advisory
referenda on the desirability of stationing nuclear weapons on German soil. 8 BVerfGE
104, 105 (1958); David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 79
(Chicago 1994).
" Ana of Nov 8, 1793, in Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 177,
178 (cited in note 19). Compare Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power at
115 (cited in note 10) (arguing that by issuing and enforcing the proclamation without
calling Congress into special session the President and his Cabinet unilaterally deter-
mined a policy of neutrality "for about a seven-month period").
21 Ana of Nov 8, 1793, in Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 179
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Hamilton, as Paciflicus, had made the same point: the fact that
only Congress could declare war meant that the President had a
"duty... to preserve Peace"; Washington would have intruded on
legislative authority if he had not taken steps to prevent individ-
uals from provoking a war that Congress had not declared."
It is easy to see how hostile acts by the President himself
may improperly interfere with Congress's power to determine
whether or not to declare war." Before we can find that the
President has a duty to take affirmative action to prevent similar
actions by private parties, however, we must find that he has the
power to do so, and it is not so obvious that he has.
Hamilton took the occasion to argue for the broadest possible
interpretation of the opening clause of Article II, § 1, which de-
clares that "the executive Power shall be vested in [the] Presi-
dent." This grant of authority, Hamilton argued, was not limited
to the particular powers enumerated in the provisions that fol-
lowed. "[Tihe difficulty of a complete and perfect specification of
all the cases of Executive authority.., would render it improba-
ble" in any event that the general terms of the Vesting Clause
were meant to be restricted by the enumeration.24 Moreover,
this inference was reinforced by the contrast in phrasing between
Articles I and II. For the first article conspicuously conferred on
Congress only the "legislative powers herein granted"; the second
contained no such restriction. Since the executive was the tra-
ditional "organ of intercourse... [with] foreign Nations," pro-
claiming our neutrality was an executive function;26 and since it
fell within none of the exceptions to the general principle ex-
pressed in the Vesting Clause, the President had acted within his
powers.2
(cited in note 19).
Pacificus No 1, in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 40
(cited in note 4).
2 Compare the congressional debate over President Polk's provocative actions toward
Mexico in 1846 and the resulting preliminary vote to condemn him for forcing the United
States into an undeclared war. Cong Globe, 30th Cong, 1st Sess 95 (Jan 3, 1848). See also
David Gray Adler, The President's War-Making Power, in Thomas E. Cronin, ed, Inventing
the American Presidency 119, 138-39 (Kansas 1989).
24 Pacificus No 1, in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 39
(cited in note 4).
2 Id.
26 Id at 37.
' Id at 39-40. Madison did not attack Hamilton's general principle that the Vesting
Clause empowered the President to exercise all powers of federal concern that were
properly classed as executive; he argued instead that the provisions in Article I for mak-
ing treaties and declaring war were not narrow exceptions to the general principle but
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To this day the crucial controversy over Hamilton's inter-
pretation of the Vesting Clause has never been authoritatively
resolved.28 The difference in phrasing between Articles I and II
is suggestive but not decisive; like other differences in phrasing,
it may well have been accidental. The Vesting Clause was plainly
designed to codify James Wilson's suggestion "that the Executive
consist of a single person" rather than a committee;29 the "here-
in granted" language in Article I was added without explanation
by the Committee of Style, which was not supposed to make sub-
stantive changes." Indeed, to take seriously the omission of sim-
ilar language from Article II might suggest that the President
could exercise executive powers that have always been under-
stood not to be federal at all, for the "herein granted" language of
Article I is a principal source of the basic tenet that legislative
powers not enumerated are reserved to the states. There is thus
much to be said for concluding that, as has recently been urged,
the Vesting Clause does nothing more than show "who has the
executive power[,] not what that power is .... ,,
But the validity of the neutrality proclamation does not
stand or fall with Hamilton's all-encompassing approach to the
Vesting Clause. To begin with, assuming that the declaration did
not invade the powers of Congress, it would have sufficed to show
that, as the Supreme Court has since concluded, the President
had broad implicit authority over foreign affairs.2 The wide-
evidence that both powers were legislative rather than executive. Helvidius No 1, in
Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 67-73 (cited in note 3). With respect
to foreign affairs, however, Jefferson had already taken Hamilton's position. See
Jefferson's Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments, Apr
24, 1790, in Julian P. Boyd, et al, eds, 16 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 378, 379
(Princeton 1961) (The transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogeth-
er. It belongs then to the head of that department, except as to such portions of it as are
specially submitted to the Senate.").
The question was debated in the opinions in the Steel Seizure Case, but enough
Justices concluded that Congress had implicitly forbidden the President's action that it is
impossible to say that a majority either embraced or rejected Hamilton's interpretation.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952); David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century, 1888-1986 365-69 (Chicago 1990).
' See Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 64-66, 88-
89, 96-97 (Yale 1911); Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention 134, 145,
171, 401, 597 (Yale 1911).
' See Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 291 (cited in note 29);
Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 151, 152, 163, 565, 590 (cited in note
29). See also id at 547 ("a Committee of five to revise the style of and to arrange the ar-
ticles agreed to by the House").
" See Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 Colum L Rev 1, 47-48 (1994).
' United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 US 304, 315-19 (1936); Currie,
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spread conviction that foreign relations was meant to be essen-
tially a federal matter, as it had been under the Articles of Con-
federation;3 the conspicuous advantages possessed by the execu-
tive in terms of the secrecy and dispatch essential to the conduct
of foreign affairs;3 4 the fact that foreign affairs remained a mat-
ter of royal prerogative in Great Britain;5 and the meager list of
foreign affairs powers expressly given to other branches all lend
support to this conclusion. The express grants of foreign affairs
authority to the President, of course, were equally sparse.
Madison's Helvidius papers demonstrated that he took no such
latitudinarian view of presidential powers in foreign affairs;31
even Hamilton's assumption that the federal government as a
whole had plenary authority in this area would be hotly disputed
in the debates over the controversial Aliens Act five years lat-
er.
3 7
But there was no need to adopt a broad view of the
President's implicit or inherent foreign affairs powers in order to
sustain the proclamation. Both Hamilton and Madison ultimately
defended it as an exercise of his express constitutional duty to
Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century at 231 n 140 (cited in note 28).
See also Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 44 (Norton 1972).
' "It will not be disputed," wrote Hamilton, "that the management of the affairs of
this country with foreign nations is confided to the Government of the [United States]."
Pacificus No 1, in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 36 (cited in
note 4). See also Fong Yue Ting v United States, 149 US 698, 711-12 (1893); Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution at 15 (cited in note 32) ("Foreign affairs are national
affairs."). On the Confederation and its antecedents see Richard B. Morris, The Forging of
the Union, 1781-1789 63 (Harper & Row 1987) ("Congress's right to conduct foreign
relations-wartime defense and diplomacy, including the negotiation of treaties-stood
unchallenged throughout the Revolutionary period."). The foreign affairs powers of the
Confederation Congress, which on their face were no broader than those granted to the
President and Congress under the new Constitution, are listed in Article IX, § 1 of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, reprinted in 1 Stat 4, 6 (1778).
'4 See Federalist 64 (Jay), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 390, 392-93
(Mentor 1961); Federalist 75 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 449,
451-52.
' See William M. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *242-51; Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs
and Constitutional Power at 10-11 (cited in note 10).
'3 See, for example, Helvidius No 1, in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James
Madison at 69 (cited in note 3). See also Bruce Stein, The Framers' Intent and the Early
Years of the Republic, 11 Hofstra L Rev 413, 511 (1982) (arguing that "the distribution of
power shows clearly that the Framers intended the Congress to predominate in foreign
policy").
1 Stat 570 (1798). Nevertheless, wrote Professor Corwin a century and a half after-
ward, "Hamilton's contention that the 'executive power' clause of the Constitution embrac-
es a prerogative in the diplomatic field which is plenary except as it is curtailed by more
specific clauses of the Constitution has consistently prospered." Corwin, President: Office
and Powers at 252-53 (cited in note 19).
The Constitution in Congress
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Hamilton made
this point at the end of his first Pacificus paper," and Madison
acknowledged it in Helvidius. The danger that the actions of
indiscreet citizens might involve us in an undeclared war and
"the duty of the Executive to preserve peace by enforcing its
laws," wrote Madison, "might have been sufficient grounds" for
the President's action.39
In bowing to the President's obligation to enforce the laws,
Madison may have given away the strongest argument against
the neutrality proclamation. Of course Article II, § 3 required the
President to enforce the laws. But Article I, § 8 empowered Con-
gress, not the President, to "define and punish ... Offenses
against the Law of Nations";40 and, with minor exceptions not
here relevant,4' Congress had not done so. Thus, in threatening
to prosecute individuals who offended the law of nations, the
President was arguably arrogating to himself or to the courts a
power the Constitution had placed in Congress.42
Congress had, of course, given the federal circuit courts juris-
diction over "all crimes and offences cognizable under the author-
ity of the United States."' The law of nations, as the Supreme
Court was soon to hold, was binding on the United States of its
own force.4" Indeed the Second Circuit has recently concluded,
' See Pacificus No 1, in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 43
(cited in note 4).
' Helvidius No 5, in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 115 (cited
in note 3). See also Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
§ 1564 at 419-20 (Da Capo 1970).
40 US Const, Art I, § 8, c 10.
41 Sections 25-28 of the Crimes Act of 1790, 1 Stat 112, 117-18, forbade interference
with foreign diplomats. See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 832-33 (cited in note 6).
" See Stein, 11 Hofstra L Rev at 468, 475-76 (cited in note 36).
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat 73, 78-79. For the argument that Senate dele-
tion of the restrictive words "and defined by the laws of the same" from an earlier draft
shows that this provision was meant to embrace nonstatutory crimes, see Charles War-
ren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv L Rev 49, 73
(1923).
" Glass v The Sloop Betsey, 3 US (3 Dall) 6, 15-16 (1794) (holding that a federal dis-
trict court had jurisdiction to decide whether restitution for a vessel taken as a war prize
could "be made consistently with the laws of nations and the treaties and laws of the
United States"); Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History 116-18
(Little, Brown 1924). For a more celebrated, if not explicit, ruling on the same point, see
The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677 (1900). See also Opinion of Edmund Randolph (June 26,
1792), in Benjamin F. Hall, comp, 1 Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the
United States 27 (Robert Farnham 1852) ("The law of nations, although not specially
adopted by the constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the
land."). Accord Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich L
Rev 1555, 1561 (1984).
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in upholding a provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act giving federal
courts jurisdiction over certain tort actions arising under interna-
tional law, that the law of nations was a law of the United States
within the meaning of Article III." It arguably follows, as Ham-
ilton argued in Pacificus, that the law of nations was one of the
"laws" the President was bound to enforce under Article II even
in the absence of congressional action.46
There are at least two challenges to the application of these
arguments in the context of criminal prosecution.47 First, au-
thority to enforce customary international law in criminal cases
is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's rejection of a
federal common law of crimes' and with the concern for fair
warning that helps to explain that decision.49 Second, if offenses
against the law of nations were already punishable, one wonders
why Congress was given power in Article I, § 8 to proscribe them.
' Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876, 885 (2d Cir 1980) (stating that "the law of na-
tions... has always been part of the federal common law").
Pacificus No 1, in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 43
(cited in note 4). See also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 111 comment c at 43-44 (1987); Louis Henkin, The President and International
Law, 80 Am J Intl L 930, 934 (1986) ('The President's duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed includes not only statutes of Congress and judge-made law, but also
treaties and principles of customary law."). Jefferson, in a letter to Monroe, acknowledged
that those who committed hostile acts against nations with which we were at peace could
be punished even in the absence of a statute. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Monroe (July 14, 1793), in Washington, ed, 4 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 17, 19
(cited in note 19). For the contrary view see Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch
and International Law, 41 Vand L Rev 1205, 1233 (1988).
" The argument that the alien tort claims provision might be explained on the
narrower ground that it implicitly federalized the law of nations or authorized the federal
courts to do so (see Textile Workers Union v Lincoln Mills, 353 US 448, 450 (1957)),
however anachronistic, would seem to be equally applicable in the criminal context on the
basis of § 11 of the same statute (see note 43), which gave the courts jurisdiction over
federal crimes.
' United States v Hudson, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("The legislative authority
of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the
Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence."). Justice Chase had taken this position
on circuit as early as 1798; Judge Peters disagreed with him, and somehow the defendant
was convicted. United States v Worrall, 28 F Cases 774, 778-80 (No 16,766) (C C D Pa
1798).
" See Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 365-66
(Byrne 1795) (arguing that punishment for common law crimes "manifestly partakes of
the odious nature of an ex post facto law, and subjects a man to an inconvenience which
he could not possibly foresee, or calculate upon, at the time of doing the act"); Stewart
Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U Pa L Rev 1003, 1061-62 (1985).
See also Article 103(2) of the German constitution (Basic Law), which forbids punishment
for any act not defined as a crime in advance by written law. See Currie, Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Germany at 130 (cited in note 19).
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The Convention record suggests possible answers to the
latter question. The power to "punish" offenses seems to have
been included in order to make clear that the subject was one of
federal rather than state concern;" the power to "define" them
was added because of a conviction that the law of nations was
"often too vague and deficient to be a rule."5' Neither of these
explanations is necessarily inconsistent with the conclusion that
the law of nations is binding on the courts of its own force in
cases in which it can be fairly ascertained or that the President
may take steps to enforce it even though Congress has not act-
ed.52
Moreover, the Supreme Court did not reject the notion of a
federal common law of crimes until United States v Hudson in
1812,"3 and even then the law of nations was arguably distin-
guishable. Hudson was a garden-variety libel case, explainable in
part by the legitimate fear that federal prosecution would un-
dermine states' rights; no one argued that foreign relations
should be left to the states." The opinion that the law of nations
was one of the "laws" the President was bound to execute was
widespread in 1793, and the text of the proclamation demon-
strates that Washington shared that conviction. Thus, even if he
was ultimately wrong on this question, his action did not repre-
sent a claim of presidential authority to create new criminal of-
' See Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 316 (cited in note 29)
(Madison arguing, in support of the provision of the same clause respecting piracy and
felonies on the high seas, that there would be "neither uniformity nor stability in the law"
if the matter were left to the states); Federalist 42 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federal-
ist Papers at 265 (cited in note 34) (complaining that by making no provision for offenses
against the law of nations the Articles of Confederation "[left] it in the power of any
indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations"); Story, 3 Commentar-
ies §§ 1158, 1160 at 56, 57-58 (cited in note 39).
" Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 615 (cited in note 29)
(Gouverneur Morris).
" In civil admiralty cases, for example, the federal courts have long been held to
have authority to develop a general maritime law despite the fact that Congress may
legislate in the same field. Compare The Lottawanna, 88 US (21 Wall) 558, 574-76 (1874),
with Butler v Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 US 527, 557 (1889).
11 US (7 Cranch) 32 (1912). See note 48.
See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
Vand L Rev 819, 843-44 (1989). See also United States v Coolidge, 25 F Cases 619, 621-22
(No 14,857), (C C D Mass 1813), where Justice Story distinguished Hudson on the ground
that federal judges had traditionally had power to enforce nonstatutory rules in admiral-
ty. Accord James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law 318-21 (Da Capo 1971). In the
Supreme Court, despite an invitation by several Justices to reexamine the question, the
Attorney General declared that he considered Hudson controlling, and "[ujnder these
circumstances" the Court elected to follow Hudson. United States v Coolidge, 14 US (1
Wheat) 415, 416-17 (1816).
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fenses; he was merely asserting the right to do his duty by en-
forcing preexisting law.
B. The Aftermath
Proclaiming neutrality, however, was one thing; enforcing it
was another. Since the law of nations had not been codified, its
contours remained murky. On Washington's orders, Jefferson
posed a famous list of clarifying questions to the Justices of the
Supreme Court.55 Stymied by their refusal to render advisory
opinions, 5 the Cabinet then formulated a set of "regulations""
reflecting an executive interpretation of international law-for
the President cannot fulfill his obligation to take care that the
law be executed without making a preliminary determination of
what it means.5
Even before the regulations were adopted, and at Jefferson's
request,59 a U.S. citizen named Gideon Henfield was indicted in
federal court for serving as prize master aboard a French pri-
vateer that preyed upon British shipping. Echoed by the Repub-
' Jefferson's covering letter to the Justices is reprinted in Washington, ed, 4 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 22 (cited in note 19), the questions themselves in
Fitzpatrick, ed, 33 The Writings of George Washington at 15-19 (cited in note 5).
' Henry P. Johnston, ed, 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 488-
89 (Knickerbocker 1891); Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 110-
11 n 1 (cited in note 4). The entire correspondence appears in Paul M. Bator, et al, eds,
Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 65-67 (Foundation 3d ed
1988). For discussion of this incident see Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the
Early Supreme Court, 1973 S Ct Rev 123, 144-55; David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888 11-14 (Chicago 1985). The Justices'
refusal was the more striking in that, only a few months before, Jay had responded
(privately) to an inquiry from Hamilton by composing a draft of a neutrality proclamation
for the President's use. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay (April 9, 1793),
in Harold C. Syrett, et al, eds, 14 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 299-300 (Columbia
1969); Letter from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton (Apr 11, 1793), in Syrett, et al, eds,
14 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 307-10. See also Wheeler, 1973 S Ct Rev at 145
("The general understanding during that period was that federal judges, like their English
counterparts, were to render advice to the executive and legislative branches.").
"' See Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 440-41 (cited in note
19); Lowrie and Clarke, eds, 1 American State Papers at 140-41 (cited in note 19); Elkins
and McKitrick, Age of Federalism at 352-53 (cited in note 1).
' See Pacificus No 1, in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 43
(cited in note 4). But see Stein, 11 Hofstra L Rev at 473 (cited in note 36) ("The
administration's neutrality measures resemble a legislative enactment rather than a mere
executive enforcement of the laws.").
' Despite his qualms about the proclamation itself, Jefferson enforced neutrality
vigorously; he had no more desire to see the United States dragged into war than anyone
else. See Thomas, American Neutrality in 1793 at 35, 51 (cited in note 10); Dumas
Malone, 3 Jefferson and His Time (Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty) 69-73 (Little,
Brown 1962).
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lican press, the defendant argued that he had violated no en-
forceable law. The court, however, disagreed. By taking part in
hostilities against nations with which we were at peace, Justice
Wilson instructed the jury, Henfield had offended both the law of
nations and treaties declaring a state of peace, and thus he had
committed an offense against the United States."
Henfield was nevertheless acquitted. Jefferson thought the
jury had been unwilling to punish a man who had not known he
was breaking the law.6 Some observers have hinted at nullifica-
tion by "a pro-French jury,"" others that the jury may have ac-
cepted the argument that there could be no punishment in the
absence of a statute.63
In any event, the acquittal of Henfield dealt a severe blow to
the policy of neutrality.' Although Washington accepted the
view of the majority of his Cabinet that there was no need to call
Congress into special session,65 he made neutrality his first or-
der of business when the Third Congress met in December 1793,
informing the lawmakers of what he had done to preserve the
peace and urging them "to extend the legal code and the juris-
diction of the Courts of the United States to many cases which,
' Henfield's Case, 11 F Cases 1099, 1105-09 (No 6,360) (C C D Pa 1793). See also
Chief Justice Jay's similar charge to a grand jury in the District of Virginia, reprinted in
11 F Cases at 1099-1105, and Johnston, ed, 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of
John Jay at 478-85 (cited in note 56); Julius Goebel, Jr., 1 History of the Supreme Court of
the United States 624-27 (Macmillan 1971). Attorney General Randolph, in an opinion
rendered to the Secretary of State, had concluded that Henfield's actions were punishable
as violations of the peace treaties and of "the common law ... of disturbing the peace."
Lowrie and Clarke, eds, 1 American State Papers at 152 (cited in note 19). Article VI, § 2
made treaties, according to Randolph, the law of the land; whether their peace provisions
should be construed as self-executing was a more difficult matter. See Henkin, Foreign
Affairs and the Constitution at 156-61 (cited in note 32).
" See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug 16, 1793), in Wash-
ington, ed, 4 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 31, 38 (cited in note 19), reprinted in
Henfield's Case, 11 F Cases at 1123 n 7.
-2 Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism at 353 (cited in note 1). See also Miller,
Federalist Era at 135 (cited in note 2) (describing the jury as "strongly predisposed in
favor of France").
6 See Jules Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and
Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 Harv Intl L J 1, 14 (1983);
Thomas, American Neutrality in 1793 at 173 (cited in note 10).
' See John Marshall, 5 The Life of George Washington, Commander in Chief of the
American Forces and First President of the United States 358-60 (AMS 1969).
' Jefferson had favored a special session, in part "[blecause several Legislative provi-
sions are wanting to enable the government to steer steadily through the difficulties daily
produced by the war of Europe, and to prevent our being involved in it by the incidents
and perplexities to which it is constantly giving birth." Opinion relative to the propriety of
convening the Legislature at an earlier period than that fixed by law (Aug 4, 1793), in
Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 441-42 (cited in note 19).
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though dependent on principles already recognised, demand some
further provisions." " Without recorded objection each House
promptly praised the President for issuing his proclamation,67
and Congress prescribed punishment for a number of crimes in-
cluding those with which Henfield had been charged 6 -- in
exercise of its indisputable authority "to define and
punish... offenses against the law of nations."69
4 Annals of Cong 10-11 (Dec 3, 1793).
4 Annals of Cong 17-18, 138-39 (Dec 6, 9, 1793). As early as August, Jefferson, rec-
ognizing the breadth of popular support for neutrality, had advised Madison that congres-
sional Republicans should endorse neutrality without quibbling over who had the power
to proclaim it. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug 11, 1793), in Mason,
et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 56-57 (cited in note 3).
'S Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat 381 ("Neutrality Act"). Despite Jefferson's admonition
(see note 67), support for the legislation was far from unanimous; the House divided
sharply over many details of the bill, and Vice President Adams had to break a tie to pass
it in the Senate. See 4 Annals of Cong 68, 743-57 (Mar 13, 1794; May 31-Jun 2, 1794).
The current version of this statute, originally intended to be temporary, can be found at
18 USC §§ 958-67 (1988 & Supp 1993).
On March 24, 1794, Washington had issued a second proclamation warning that the
enlistment of troops in Kentucky to attack the territories of a friendly power (Spain) wyas
"contrary to the laws of nations" and calling on "courts, magistrates, and other officers" to
suppress it. George Washington, Proclamation, in Richardson, ed, 1 Messages and Papers
of the Presidents at 157-58 (cited in note 10). Since the Neutrality Act had not yet been
adopted, this proclamation too was based on the theory that the President had authority
to enforce the unwritten law of nations. For a brief sketch of the background of this
proclamation, see Thomas, American Neutrality in 1793 at 177-87 (cited in note 10).
' See United States v Arjona, 120 US 479, 488 (1887) (dictum); Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr 2, 1798), in David B. Mattern, et al, eds, 17 The Papers
of James Madison 104-05 (Virginia 1991). For the argument that the Neutrality Act went
beyond the existing requirements of the law of nations, see Lobel, 24 Harv Intl L J at 16-
20 (cited in note 63); for the view that the true basis of the statute lies in Congress's war
powers, see id at 28.
Other issues of presidential authority over foreign affairs were debated within the
executive branch during the same period. In April, 1793, as it approved Washington's
neutrality proclamation, the Cabinet unanimously agreed that he should receive the new
French minister, Edmond Gen~t. Although Hamilton argued that to receive Genit was to
recognize the new French government, no one suggested consulting Congress-though
Madison was soon to argue that the President's authority to "receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers," US Const, Art II, § 3, was purely ceremonial. See Ana of May 6,
1793, in Catanzariti, et al, eds, 25 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 666 (cited in note
12), also reprinted in Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 142-43 (cited
in note 19); Helvidius No 3, in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 95-
98 (cited in note 3), quoting Federalist 69 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed The Federalist
Papers at 420; Thomas, American Neutrality in 1793 at 68-77 (cited in note 10); Corwin,
President: Office and Powers at 213 (cited in note 19); Miller, Federalist Era at 129 (cited
in note 2), citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Mar 12, 1793), in
Catanzariti, et al, eds, 25 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 367 (noting that Jefferson
had already instructed Gouverneur Morris to deal with the new French government).
After receiving written opinions from the Cabinet, Washington also rejected
Hamilton's suggestion that the change of government had "suspended" U.S. obligations
under the 1778 treaties with France, thus avoiding the difficult constitutional question
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II. DEFENSE
At the same time President Washington informed the House
and Senate of what he had done to keep the Nation out of war,
he urged them to strengthen the national defenses. For even the
best efforts to stay out of trouble might not succeed, and in any
event, "[i]f we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it;
if we desire to secure peace,... it must be known that we are at
all times ready for war." ° Congress took its time in responding,
but ultimately it enacted a package of defense measures that illu-
minated a number of aspects of congressional war powers.
A. The Scope of Federal Authority
Pursuant to its explicit authority "to raise and support Ar-
mies,"" Congress provided for the fortification of harbors,72 the
establishment of arsenals and armories,73 and the enlistment of
whether the President alone could terminate a treaty. See Ana of Apr 18, 1793, in
Catanzariti, et al, eds, 25 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 666, also reprinted in Wash-
ington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 143; Pacificus No 1, in Syrett, et al, eds,
15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 41-42 (cited in note 4); Helvidius No 3, in Mason,
et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 98-101; Thomas, American Neutrality in
1793 at 54-66; Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996 (1979). Finally, when it became necessary
to ask for the recall of the impossible Gendt for continually flouting our neutrality, it was
Washington, as arbiter of our diplomatic relations (again presumably under the authority
to receive foreign envoys), who made the decision (on the basis of a unanimous Cabinet
recommendation), and Jefferson who willingly carried it out, without suggesting that
Congress should have any say in the matter. See Ana of Aug 1, 1793, in Washington, ed,
9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 162; Corwin, President: Office and Powers at 213;
Miller, Federalist Era at 131-39; Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism at 351-52 (cited
in note 1).
7' 4 Annals of Cong 12 (Dec 3, 1793).
71 US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 12.
72 Act of Mar 20, 1794, 1 Stat 345. Section 3 of the statute authorized the President
to accept any land ceded for this purpose by a state under Art I, § 8, cl 17, which express-
ly mentions "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, [and] dock-Yards." See Act of Mar 20, 1794 § 3,
1 Stat at 346. Recognizing that national defenses ought not depend on the will of any
individual state, Congress provided in the same section authority to acquire the necessary
land by purchase, indicating an understanding that clause 17 was not meant to limit the
authority implicit in other provisions, but only to provide a means for acquiring the power
of "exclusive legislation" over areas acquired for the stated purposes. See Fort
Leavenworth R.R. v Lowe, 114 US 525, 530 (1885).
A different question of the meaning of clause 17 was raised when the President
called Congress's attention to the fact that several states had qualified their cessions of
lighthouses to the United States by reserving the right to serve process within the ceded
areas. 4 Annals of Cong 36 (Jan 21, 1794). Congress approved these reservations, suggest-
ing that it read the constitutional provision giving it the power of "exclusive legislation"
over such areas not to require it to exclude state authority entirely. Act of Mar 2, 1795, 1
Stat 426. Compare Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 848 (cited in note 6).
73 Act of Apr 2, 1794, 1 Stat 352.
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additional troops. 4 Similarly, although no Navy Department
was yet established,75 Congress laid the foundations for the Na-
vy by authorizing the construction or purchase of six frigates76
and ten galleys" under its power "[tlo provide and maintain a
Navy."78 In addition, Congress authorized the President to re-
quire the executives of the various states to hold a specified num-
ber of militiamen "in readiness to march at a moment's
warning,"79 presumably as an incident to employing them, under
the authority provided two years earlier, to repel any possible
invasion.8
Less obvious perhaps in their constitutional bases were two
further measures taken by the Third Congress: a ban on arms
exports8' and an embargo on the departure of ships bound for
foreign ports.8 2 In the literal sense both were regulations of for-
eign commerce, unless one is prepared to accept a distinction be-
tween regulations and prohibitions that is more formal than
substantial 83 and that cannot be justified in terms of the known
purposes of the Commerce Clause." The protective tariff provi-
Act of May 9, 1794, 1 Stat 366. See also Act of Mar 3, 1795, 1 Stat 430. In a para-
graph largely devoted to improvement of the militia, Washington alluded to the desirabili-
ty of providing "an opportunity for the study of those branches of the military art which
can scarcely ever be attained by practice alone." 4 Annals of Cong 12 (Dec 3, 1793).
Jefferson had advised the President a few days earlier that Congress had no authority to
establish a military academy, though it seems preposterous to deny that the power to
raise and support armies includes the power to train them. See Ana of Nov 23, 1793, in
Washington, ed, 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 182 (cited in note 19). Congress
did not act on Washington's suggestion; it was not until 1802 that the academy at West
Point was founded, and then on the initiative of President Jefferson. See Act of Mar 16,
1802 § 27, 2 Stat 132, 137; James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U.S. Army, 1783-
1812 280, 288-89 (Princeton 1947).
7' Earlier in the session Madison had bravely opposed the creation of a Navy on the
ground that it would be cheaper to go on paying tribute to the Barbary pirates. 4 Annals
of Cong 433 (Feb 6, 1794). See also id at 434 (Rep Baldwin); Leonard White, The Federal-
ists: A Study in Administrative History 156-57 (Macmillan 1948).
76 Act of Mar 27, 1794, 1 Stat 350.
" Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat 376.
7 US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 13.
'9 Act of May 9, 1794 § 1, 1 Stat 367, 367.
See Act of May 2, 1792 § 1, 1 Stat 264, 264; US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 15. The modem
eye may be struck by the fact that this statute imposed affirmative obligations on state
officers, but Congress had done so before in the militia context, and this time too there
was no constitutional objection.
sI Act of May 22, 1794, 1 Stat 369.
The embargo was first imposed for thirty days and then extended for thirty-seven
more. Act of Mar 26, 1794, 1 Stat 400; Act of Apr 18, 1794, 1 Stat 401.
' Every regulation prohibits something, and every prohibition of one aspect of com-
merce is a regulation of commerce as a whole.
' See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 781-82 (cited in note 6). Madison emphasized those
purposes in moving to protect our foreign commerce through the enactment of retaliatory
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sions enacted in 1789 had established without dissent that the
power to regulate commerce included the power to restrict it.
s5
Moreover, both the ban on arms exports and the embargo could
be defended as exercises of the war powers, the former to ensure
an adequate supply of arms for our own defense86 and both to
prevent incidents that belligerent nations might view as cause for
war." What was significant, as so often is the case, was the
nonbarking dog. Though the Federalists were to scream constitu-
tariff, tonnage, and trade restrictions against Britain, as Jefferson had recently proposed.
See 4 Annals of Cong 155-58, 209-11 (Jan 3, 14, 1794); Report of the Secretary of State on
the Privileges and Restrictions on the Commerce of the United States in Foreign Coun-
tries, in Lowrie and Clarke, eds, 1 American State Papers at 300 (cited in note 19); Elkins
and McKitrick, Age of Federalism at 375-88 (cited in note 1).
Madison would have used the resulting revenue to indemnify victims of British
depredations. 4 Annals of Cong 156, 157 (Jan 3, 1794). Others advocated indemnity as
well. See 4 Annals of Cong 535 (Mar 27, 1794) (Rep Dayton); 4 Annals of Cong 614 (Apr
30, 1794) (Rep Goodhue). No one challenged Congress's authority to provide it. Madison
defended indemnity on the basis of the law of nations without saying why the law of
nations was a source of congressional power; he might have argued it was necessary and
proper to the encouragement of commerce. Compare the arguments for indemnity of offi-
cers and others injured in the Whiskey Rebellion, which was defended as a means of
encouraging support for suppressing the insurrection and thus as necessary and proper to
enforcing the laws. See 4 Annals of Cong 984-87, 989-1002 (Dec 16-17, 19, 1794); see also
text accompanying note 136.
Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, who would have established a fund for indemnifica-
tion by sequestering debts owed to British subjects, defended his proposal as part of the
overall defense package. 4 Annals of Cong 535 (Mar 27, 1794). Elias Boudinot, also of New
Jersey, who opposed this measure on policy grounds, conceded that the power to sequester
debts in reprisal for hostile acts was both recognized by the law of nations and implicit in
the greater power to declare war. Id at 537. See Miller, Federalist Era at 151-52 (cited in
note 2) (adding that Hamilton "did not doubt that sequestration would lead to war... in
the worst of causes-to enable debtors to escape from paying their creditors their just
dues").
See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 781-82 (cited in note 6).
The title of the Act described one of its purposes as "encouraging the Importation"
of arms, and § 5 removed import duties on arms for a period of two years. See Act of May
22, 1794, 1 Stat at 370.
b7 Representative Sedgwick, who proposed the embargo, defended it as a means of
preventing Great Britain from supplying her Caribbean possessions in the event of an
attack on the French West Indies. See 4 Annals of Cong 500-04 (Mar 12, 1794). In 1793,
however, Jefferson had denied that either the law of nations or U.S. policy required a ban
on selling arms to belligerents; it was enough that the neutrality proclamation had
warned arms traders that the Government would not protect them. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), in HA. Washington, ed, 3 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 557-59 (Riker 1854); Thomas, American Neutrality in 1793
at 247-50 (cited in note 10). See also Miller, Federalist Era at 154 (cited in note 2) (ar-
guing that the embargo was "[i]ntended to prevent the capture of American ships by
British cruisers").
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tional objections to Jefferson's embargo in 1807,88 nobody even
hinted that an embargo was beyond Congress's power in 1794.9
In order to finance this array of defense measures9" Con-
gress increased tariffs on specified imports9' and imposed excis-
es on retailers of wines and foreign spirits,92 on snuff and re-
fined sugar, 3 and on auction sales.94 There was no serious con-
stitutional objection to any of these measures. Tariffs had been
enacted in 1789, and the new excises were indistinguishable from
that assessed on whiskey producers in 1791."
A levy of one to ten dollars to be paid by the owners of car-
riages, attacked as a "direct" tax not apportioned among the
states according to population as required by Article I, §§ 2 and
9, provoked a significant debate over the meaning of that conced-
edly vague constitutional term. Samuel Dexter of Massachusetts
and John Nicholas of Virginia agreed that (as Dexter put it) "all
taxes are direct which are paid by the citizen without being rec-
ompensed by the consumer" but differed as to whether the car-
riage tax could be passed on.96 William Vans Murray of Mary-
land thought the tax on carriages no different from that previous-
ly imposed on stills;97 Samuel Smith of Maryland responded
that, unlike carriages, stills were taxed only when they were
used.9" Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts anticipated the ar-
' See United States v The William, 28 F Cases 614 (No 16,700) (D Mass 1808)
(upholding the embargo on both commerce and war-power grounds); Warren, 1 Supreme
Court in United States History at 341-51 (cited in note 44).
Alexander White, who had recently left Congress, defended the embargo as being
"connected with War as well as with commerce,... Congress having the sole power in
both these cases, their right to lay an Embargo will hardly be disputed." Letter from Alex-
ander White to James Madison (Mar 30, 1794), in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of
James Madison at 298 (cited in note 3).
' House members whined so over the inequity of each proposal for new taxes that
Representative Dexter was moved at one point to remind his colleagues that "[i]f we have
the benefits of Government, we must pay for them." 4 Annals of Cong 628 (May 2, 1794).
9' Act of June 7, 1794, 1 Stat 390.
Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat 376.
'3 Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat 384.
'4 Act of June 9, 1794, 1 Stat 397.
' See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 785-88 (cited in note 6).
4 Annals of Cong 646 (May 6, 1794). See also Letter of Alexander White to James
Madison (May 19, 1794), in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 335-36
(cited in note 3) (agreeing with Nicholas that it could not be); St. George Tucker, ed, 1
Blackstone's Commentaries 233-34 (Birch & Small 1803) (concluding on this basis that a
tax on wheels would be indirect if assessed against the wheelwright but not if assessed
against the carriage owner).
9 4 Annals of Cong 653 (May 7, 1794).
'8 Id. See also 4 Annals of Cong 730 (May 29, 1794) (Rep Ames) (insisting that "the
[carriage] duty falls not on the possession, but the use").
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guments that would dominate the opinions of the several Justices
when the Supreme Court upheld the tax: "[I]t would astonish the
people of America to be informed that they had made a Constitu-
tion by which pleasure carriages and other objects of luxury were
excepted from contributing to the public exigencies," and "as sev-
eral of the States had few or no carriages, no such apportionment
could be made."99 The tax was enacted;..0 the debates do not
reveal a consensus as to why it was not "direct."
B. The President and Congress
More important at the time than the questions of federalism
raised by the defense measures taken by the Third Congress
were those of the separation of powers.
Representative Sedgwick had originally proposed that the
decision whether to impose an embargo be left to the President:
"On great occasions, confidence must be reposed in the Execu-
tive."'' Congress's decision to impose the embargo by joint res-
olution suggests a preference for reserving to itself the basic
policy decision. Yet before adjourning, Congress delegated to the
President authority to lay a new embargo during the legislative
recess "whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so re-
quire" and "under such regulations as the circumstances... may
require," 2 and no one is reported as suggesting any constitu-
tional problem with this measure."3 Similarly, although the
number of galleys the President could construct or acquire was
4 Annals of Cong 644-45 (May 6, 1794). See also Hylton v United States, 3 US (3
Dal) 171 (1796); Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years at
31-37 (cited in note 56). A direct tax, which several members assumed would fall upon
land, was rejected on policy grounds. See 4 Annals of Cong 640-42, 647 (May 5, 6, 1794).
Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat 373.
101 4 Annals of Cong 503 (Mar 12, 1794).
1C2 Act of June 4, 1794, 1 Stat 372. The discretion given by this statute was far
broader than that upheld in the famous case of The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v United
States, 11 US (7 Cranch) 382 (1813), where the Court struggled to demonstrate that, in
determining whether England or France had ceased violating our neutrality, the Presi-
dent was merely making a finding of fact. See Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court:
The First Hundred Years at 118-19 (cited in note 56).
"03 Alexander White, noting the inconvenience of requiring passage of a statute when
Congress might not be in session, wrote Madison that he saw "no objection" to authorizing
the President to lay an embargo "under proper regulations." Letter from Alexander White
to James Madison (Mar 30, 1794), in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison
at 297-98 (cited in note 3). Along the same lines, just before its final adjournment the
Third Congress empowered the President to permit the export of arms "in cases connected
with the security of the commercial interest of the United States," Act of Mar 3, 1795, 1
Stat 444, despite the statute it had earlier enacted. See text accompanying note 81.
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limited to ten after Madison insisted the statute must specify a
number,' no one is recorded as having objected to the fact that
the President was given virtually unlimited discretion to resolve
the more fundamental question whether to build them at all, the
statute authorizing him to do so if it "shall appear to him neces-
sary for the protection of the United States."'
The absence of objection was the more notable because, just
a few days before, the House had emphatically rejected a bill that
would have authorized but not required the President to raise an
additional ten thousand troops after William Branch Giles of
Virginia' and Madison had complained that it effectively
transferred to the President Congress's power "to raise ... ar-
mies""' 7 -an especially dangerous delegation, Madison added, in
view of the Framers' clear decision to separate the power to raise
troops from the power to command them.' 8
Madison thus succeeded in preventing a delegation to the
President of discretion whether or not to raise troops, but not in
his further effort to provide that the troops that were raised
"should only be employed for the protection of the frontier."0 9
He did not argue that the Constitution limited the discretion the
President could be given in determining how the troops should be
employed, and indeed one can make the argument that his pro-
posal would impermissibly have limited the President's constitu-
tional authority as Commander in Chief."' The same policy of
separation that Madison invoked to deny that the President could
raise troops, combined with the Framers' patent desire to avoid
the inefficiencies and dangers of entrusting tactical and strategic
decisions to a committee,"' suggests that Congress infringes on
the President's powers if it attempts to exercise the power of
command. The counterargument is that defining the purposes for
. 4 Annals of Cong 762 (June 3, 1794). See also 4 Annals of Cong 764 (June 4, 1794)
(Rep Dayton). Neither Madison nor Dayton expressly invoked the Constitution.
105 Act of June 5, 1794 § 1, 1 Stat at 376.
" Giles was a leading representative of the developing Republican party. Richard E.
Welch, Jr., Theodore Sedgwick, Federalist: A Political Portrait 134 (Weslyan 1965).
' 4 Annals of Cong 738 (May 30, 1794).
"0 Id. See also Madison's Political Observations (Apr 20, 1795), in Mason, et al, eds,
15 The Papers of James Madison at 511, 521 (cited in note 3).
109 His proposed amendment to this effect received only twenty-six votes. See 4 Annals
of Cong 1221 (Feb 13, 1795).
11 See US Const, Art II, § 2. This argument was apparently not made either; both
sides treated the question as one purely of policy.
"' "Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly
demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand."
Federalist 74 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 447 (cited in note 34).
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which troops can be used is not a question of military tactics or
strategy, but rather one of those basic policy decisions reserved to
Congress by the various grants of legislative war powers. Argu-
ably the question whether to employ troops is implicit in the
question whether to fight, which Congress makes under its au-
thority to declare war; arguably the power to raise troops in-
cludes authority to determine the purposes for which they may
be used.
Yet another kind of separation-of-powers objection was raised
when Abraham Clark of New Jersey asked the House to go be-
yond the embargo to forbid the importation of any articles pro-
duced in Great Britain or Ireland." Defended as a classic regula-
tion of commerce, which it was,"' this "nonintercourse" propos-
al was assailed as an invasion of the power of the President and
Senate to make treaties, for the preamble of Clark's resolution
revealed that its purpose was to put economic pressure on Brit-
ain to make reparations for violations of our neutral rights and
to evacuate forts within our territory still occupied in defiance of
the 1783 peace treaty." President Washington, as Sedgwick
observed, had just sent a special envoy to England to negotiate
on those very issues; to ban imports until Britain yielded on
those points would dictate to the President what treaty to
make.1
5
If this argument sounds familiar, it is because it is essential-
ly the converse of the arguments the friends of France had made
against the neutrality proclamation." 6 By committing us to
peace, it was then urged, the President obstructed Congress's
authority to declare war; by cutting off trade, it was now insisted,
Congress would impede the President's exercise of the treaty
power.
1 4 Annals of Cong 561 (Apr 7, 1794). Passed by the House, the proposal was defeat-
ed by the Vice President's tie-breaking vote in the Senate. See 4 Annals of Cong 604-05
(Apr 24, 1794) (House); 4 Annals of Cong 89-90 (Apr 28, 1794) (Senate); Miller, Federalist
Era at 154 (cited in note 2).
11 See Federalist 11, 22 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 84-91,
143-45 (cited in note 34) (defending the grant of authority over foreign commerce as a
means of enabling Congress to retaliate for foreign commercial restrictions).
114 4 Annals of Cong 561 (Apr 7, 1794). Washington had complained of interference
with our commerce by both Britain and France in a letter to Congress at the beginning of
the session. 4 Annals of Cong 15 (Dee 5, 1793).
. 4 Annals of Cong 569-70 (Apr 10, 1794). See also 4 Annals of Cong 584 (Apr 14,
1794) (Rep William Smith); 4 Annals of Cong 589 (Apr 14, 1794) (Rep Dexter). Since the
President had already appointed a negotiator, opponents of the measure argued, Congress
had no right to interfere. 4 Annals of Cong 600 (Apr 18, 1794).
"' See text accompanying notes 12-19.
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One can distinguish the cases, if one likes, on the ground
that in issuing his proclamation, President Washington dis-
claimed any intention of committing the country to anything
more than an observance of its international obligations pending
Congress's decision whether or not to declare war. On a more
fundamental plane, however, both incidents demonstrate the
perspicacity of Hamilton's insight in defense of the proclamation:
in many matters involving foreign relations, the President and
Congress have overlapping powers.11v Congress's authority to
regulate commerce is as explicit as the President's authority to
negotiate treaties. What one may do may frustrate the exercise of
authority by the other. But there is no warrant in the Consti-
tution for giving precedence to either; this is one of those situa-
tions in which, for better or worse, the Framers knowingly sacri-
ficed coherence and efficiency in the interest of separation of
powers.
III. ST. DOMINGO
The most important spending controversy during the Third
Congress concerned appropriations for the relief of refugees from
disturbances in the French colony on the West Indian island of
Hispaniola, known in the debates by the name of St. Domingo.
A number of French citizens had landed in Baltimore in the
last days of 1793,118 where they had been supported by private
and state contributions. Responding to a petition for federal as-
sistance, a House committee urged that federal funds be made
available," and they were, 2 ' but not until after yet another
debate on the limits of the power to spend.
Virtually everyone wanted to help. Nicholas, doubting that
Congress had authority "to bestow the money of their constitu-
ents on an act of charity," declared his willingness to tell the
voters he had exceeded his powers and throw himself on their
mercy.'2' "In a case of this kind," Clark trumpeted, "we were
not to be tied up by the Constitution." 2
"' Pacificus No 1, in Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton at 40-42
(cited in note 4).
118 See 4 Annals of Cong 169-70 (Jan 10, 1794) (Rep Samuel Smith).
19 See Committee Report (Jan 10, 1794), in Lowrie and Clarke, eds, 1 American State
Papers at 308 (cited in note 19).
120 Act of Feb 12, 1794, 6 Stat 13.
121 4 Annals of Cong 170, 172 (Jan 10, 1794).
"' 4 Annals of Cong 350 (Jan 28, 1794). See also William Smith's argument, in
opposition to the resolutions proposed by Representative Giles during the Second Con-
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Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, always an exponent of broad
federal authority, trotted out the General Welfare Clause once
again. 3 But although he professed to think it obvious that re-
lief of Caribbean refugees came within that provision, it was not;
even so latitudinarian an interpreter as Justice Story would later
express doubt that the "general welfare of the United States"
would be served by expenditures for building foreign palaces or
"for propagating Mahometanism among the Turks."'24
As in the recent codfish controversy,' Madison found a
way out of the dilemma that would enable Congress to satisfy the
obligations of fraternit6 without "establishing a dangerous prece-
dent, which might hereafter be perverted to the countenance of
purposes very different from those of charity." 6 The United
States owed money to France for assistance provided during the
Revolution; Congress should authorize relief for the refugees in
partial payment of this obligation.'27 That is what Congress
did,' and thus the question of the meaning of the General Wel-
fare Clause was avoided once again.'29
gress, respecting the right to ignore limitations in appropriation laws in an emergency. 3
Annals of Cong 901-02 (Feb 28, 1793).
"2 4 Annals of Cong 172 (Jan 10, 1794).
124 Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 919 at 382
(Da Capo 1970).
" In response to pleas for relief from New England cod fisherman economically
pressed by foreign and domestic duties and competitors' "bounties" (subsidies), the Senate
in early 1791 sent to the House a bill providing for the payment of a bounty-based on
the size of the boats and the quantity of fish caught-to owners of vessels employed in cod
fisheries. Several representatives, including Madison, objected that Congress had no
authority to grant bounties, but others replied that Congress could do so under the taxing,
spending, and commerce powers. In the end, Madison broke the impasse: while disavow-
ing bounties as both dangerous and unnecessary, he suggested that the subsidy be con-
sidered a reimbursement for the domestic duties extracted from the cod fishermen. Thus
Congress was merely paying a debt, not granting a bounty. His position satisfied both
sides-the fishermen got their money, and the statute provided for an "allowance," rather
than a bounty. See Currie, 90 Nw U L Rev (cited in note 9).
126 4 Annals of Cong 170 (Jan 10, 1794).
17 4 Annals of Cong 170-71 (Jan 10, 1794). One of the express purposes for which
taxes may be laid and collected, of course, is "to pay the Debts... of the United States."
US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 1.
"Z See Act of Feb 12, 1794 § 3, 6 Stat at 13 ("[T]he amount thereof shall be provision-
ally charged to the debit of the French Republic, subject to such future arrangements as
shall be made thereon, between the government of the United States and the said Repub-
lic.").
" A month later, following the precedent of subsidy by tax forgiveness established in
the codfish case, see note 125, Congress also forgave the tonnage duties assessed on the
ship that had brought the refugees to this country. Act of Mar 7, 1794, 1 Stat 342.
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IV. INSURRECTION
Congress was not in session in August 1794, when resistance
to the liquor excise in western Pennsylvania became ugly. Pursu-
ant to the authority Congress had given him two years be-
fore, 3 ' President Washington recited Justice Wilson's finding
that ordinary processes were insufficient to enforce the laws,
ordered the insurgents to disperse, and gave notice that he was
taking steps to call out the militia.'3 ' When this warning was
ignored, he marched the militia to the rebellious counties in per-
son, and the insurrection melted away before him.'32
By the time Congress reassembled in November it was all
over. The President told Congress what he had done.'33 Con-
gress commended him"M and appropriated money to cover the
cost of the expedition,'35 which he had undertaken in the rea-
sonable expectation that Congress would pay for it later. Con-
gress also authorized the expenditure of $8,500 to indemnify
federal officers and citizens who had supported them for property
destroyed by the mob-an expenditure obviously necessary and
proper, like the officers' salaries, to the execution of the laws.'36
... Act of May 2, 1792 § 1, 1 Stat at 264.
1 See George Washington, Proclamation, in Richardson, ed, 1 Messages and Papers
of the Presidents at 158-60 (cited in note 10). As early as 1792 the President had warned
against obstruction of the laws and directed federal officers to enforce them. Id at 124-25.
1 See Washington's proclamation of Sept 25, 1794, in Richardson, ed, 1 Messages and
Papers of the Presidents at 161-62 (cited in note 10), announcing that the militia was on
its way. The story is told concisely in Miller, Federalist Era at 155-62 (cited in note 2),
and in Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic at 93-98 (cited in note 1), and less
so in Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism at 461-83 (cited in note 1). The most com-
plete account can be found in Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier
Epilogue to the American Revolution (Oxford 1986).
13 4 Annals of Cong 787-91 (Nov 19, 1794).
See 4 Annals of Cong 794 (Nov 21, 1794) (Senate); 4 Annals of Cong 947-49 (Nov
28, 1794) (House). At the President's request Congress authorized him to call up addition-
al militiamen to prevent a new outbreak of violence, Act of Nov 29, 1794, 1 Stat 403, since
the obligations of those initially summoned were about to expire. See 4 Annals of Cong
790 (Nov 19, 1794).
" Act of Dec 31, 1794, 1 Stat 404. Gallatin thought Washington should have called a
special session of Congress, since the funds he used had been appropriated for the army,
not for the militia. A Sketch of the Finances of the United States, in Henry Adams, ed, 3
The Writings of Albert Gallatin 69, 117-18 (Antiquarian 1960). See the discussion of this
problem in connection with the Giles Resolutions in Currie, 90 Nw U L Rev (cited in note
9).
9 Act of Feb 27, 1795, 1 Stat 423. See 4 Annals of Cong 996 (Dec 19, 1794) (Rep
Hartley) ("When the officers know that they are to be protected in their persons and prop-
erty-when the posse comitatus are informed that they are to be regarded in like man-
ner-we may expect energy in the execution of the laws."). Congress also amended the
law defining the occasions on which the President could call out the militia, eliminating
some of the restrictions enacted in 1792. Act of Feb 28, 1795, 1 Stat 424; see Currie, 90
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The President sensibly pardoned all who had taken part in the
uprising," ' including-in accord with the understanding ex-
pressed in the Philadelphia Convention-those who had not yet
been put on trial."'
Thus the Whiskey Rebellion came to a happy end; the new
Government had survived its first crisis, to nearly everyone's
satisfaction, and it had acted in full compliance with the Con-
stitution. Along the way, however, the President had made one
serious mistake. In his otherwise measured address to Congress,
he had accused "certain self-created societies" of encouraging the
insurrection.'39
Everyone knew what "societies" the President had in mind:
the Democratic Societies, sometimes disparagingly called Jacobin
Clubs, which had sprung up all over the country in the enthusi-
Nw U L Rev (cited in note 9). Washington's plea that Congress also strengthen the
provisions respecting organization of the militia, however, fell on deaf ears despite power-
ful arguments by Sedgwick and others in favor of a vigorous exercise of congressional
authority. See 4 Annals of Cong 791 (Nov 19, 1794) (Washington's plea); 4 Annals of Cong
1067-71 (Jan 9, 1795) (arguments by Sedgwick and others). The principal problem, spelled
out in a report from the Secretary of War, was that Congress had required militiamen to
arm themselves, but had provided no penalties to enforce the requirement, as even Giles
conceded it had power to do. See 4 Annals of Cong 1396-97 (Dec 10, 1794) (report of
Secretary of War); 4 Annals of Cong 1071 (Jan 9, 1795) (Giles's concession).
" See George Washington, Proclamation, in Richardson, ed, 1 Messages and Papers
of the Presidents at 161-62 (cited in note 10). In his proclamation Washington had brand-
ed the insurrection as "treason," id at 159, and two of the insurgents were convicted of
that offense after Justice Paterson charged the jury that if the object of the revolt was "to
suppress the excise offices, and to prevent the execution of an act of congress," it met the
constitutional definition of treason. United States v Mitchell, 26 F Cases 1277, 1281 (No
15,788) (C C D Pa 1795). As an original matter there seems to have been something to the
argument of the defense, id at 1279, that not every case of organized resistance to the
laws rose to the level of "levying war" against the United States, as Article HI, § 3 re-
quired.
'" See George Washington, Proclamation, in Richardson, ed, 1 Messages and Papers
of the Presidents at 181 (cited in note 10); Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Conven-
tion at 426 (cited in note 29). See also Forrest McDonald, The American Presidency: An
Intellectual History 240 (Kansas 1994) (arguing that by issuing a blanket amnesty Wash-
ington construed the pardon power to give him authority to make general dispensations of
the laws). But see Corwin, President: Office and Powers at 137 (cited in note 19) (arguing
that in light of common law tradition the pardon power should not have been construed to
embrace a general amnesty).
'" 4 Annals of Cong 788 (Nov 19, 1794). See Letter from James Madison to James
Monroe (Dec 4, 1794), in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James Madison at 406 (cited
in note 3) (describing the remark as "perhaps the greatest error of his political life"). For
the depth of Washington's feelings against these societies, see Letter from George Wash-
ington to Henry Lee (Aug 26, 1794), in Fitzpatrick, ed, 33 The Writings of George Wash-
ington at 474-76 (cited in note 5); Letter from George Washington to Major General
Daniel Morgan (Oct 8, 1794), in Fitzpatrick, ed, 33 The Writings of George Washington at
524.
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asm created by the French Revolution. 4 ' When Thomas
Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania moved to insert in the House's cere-
monial reply to the President's speech a paragraph expressing
"reprobation" of these Societies,' the friends of France explod-
ed in wrath. If the Societies offended the law, said Giles, let them
be brought to justice; but it was not the House's business to act
as a board of censure or "to attempt checking or restraining pub-
lic opinion."' The Constitution gave Congress no authority to
denounce private associations; members of the societies had "the
inalienable privilege of thinking, of speaking, of writing, and of
printing"; the proposal "confounded the innocent with the guilty"
and condemned them all without a hearing.' Madison, who
had voted with Giles less than two years earlier to condemn
Alexander Hamilton without a hearing,' called the measure a
vote of attainder;" Thomas Carnes of Georgia said it would in-
fringe freedom of speech and assembly.'
For a week the House debated nothing but its reply to the
President's speech. The occasion was trivial but the principle
important; the debate presaged the arguments over the Sedition
Act.'47 Murray said he would not vote to abolish the Democratic
Societies, but he saw nothing wrong in warning the people
against them;' 8 Madison responded that, as the infamous list
14 See Miller, Federalist Era at 160-62 (cited in note 2); Elkins and McKitrick, Age of
Federalism at 451-61 (cited in note 1); Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic at
85-89 (cited in note 1).
141 4 Annals of Cong 899 (Nov 24, 1794).
142 Id at 899-901. "[Tlhere was not an individual in America," Giles added, "who might
not come under the charge of being a member of some one or other self-created society.
Associations of this kind, religious, political, and philosophical, were to be found in every
quarter of the Continent." Id at 899-900. See also id at 905 (Rep Nicholas) ("[B]ut I cannot
agree to persecution for the sake of opinions.").
1 4 Annals of Cong 916-19 (Nov 26, 1795).
14 See Currie, 90 Nw U L Rev (cited in note 9).
145 4 Annals of Cong 934 (Nov 27, 1794). Madison did not advert to the effort to be-
smirch Hamilton, but he distinguished the investigation of General St. Clair on the
ground that, unlike the Democratic Societies, St. Clair was employed "in the public
service." Id at 935.
146 "Sir, by this amendment you would prevent the freedom of speech, and lock the
mouths of men." 4 Annals of Cong 941 (Nov 27, 1794). See also Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Dec 28, 1794), in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of James
Madison at 426-27 (cited in note 3) ("It is wonderful indeed that the President should
have permitted himself to be the organ of such an attack on the freedom of discussion, the
freedom of writing, printing & publishing.").
147 See Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800 419
(Bobbs-Merrill 1950).
" 4 Annals of Cong 906-07 (Nov 25, 1794). William Smith added that the House had
had no hesitation in expressing opinions on matters outside its legislative competence
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of "subversive" organizations compiled by the Attorney General
taught us a century and a half later, denunciation was punish-
ment too. 49 Dexter offered a more sinister defense of the cen-
sure proposal. Fisher Ames of Massachusetts had already argued,
with considerable justice, that the right of assembly did not em-
brace a conspiracy to obstruct the laws;5 Dexter asserted that
the Constitution gave no one "the precious right of vilifying and
misrepresenting their own Government and laws."' Ames as-
sailed the Societies for their secrecy 52 and professed to find the
very existence of private associations as intermediaries between
citizens and their government a threat to republican princi-
ples. 5
3
Cooler heads ultimately prevailed, and the response was
watered down greatly:
when, at the insistence of many of those who objected to criticizing the Democratic Societ-
ies, it had applauded the new French constitution. 4 Annals of Cong 942-43 (Nov 27,
1794). See also note 19.
"' 4 Annals of Cong 934 (Nov 27, 1794). Madison was even more emphatic in private:
It must be seen that no two principles can be either more indefensible in reason, or
more dangerous in practice-than that 1. arbitrary denunciations may punish, what
the law permits, & what the Legislature has no right, by law, to prohibit-and that
2. the Govt. may stifle all censures whatever on its misdoings; for if it be itself the
Judge it will never allow any censures to be just, and if it can suppress censures
flowing from one lawful source it may those flowing from any other-from the press
and from individuals as well as from Societies, &c.
Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Dec 4, 1794), in Mason, et al, eds, 15 The
Papers of James Madison at 405, 407 (cited in note 3). For discussion of the Attorney
General's list see Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century at 357
(cited in note 28).
150 4 Annals of Cong 922 (Nov 26, 1794).
' ' 4 Annals of Cong 937 (Nov 27, 1794). See also 4 Annals of Cong 923 (Nov 26, 1794)
(Rep Ames) (accusing the Societies of spreading, in Washington's words, 'jealousies,
suspicions and accusations of the Government").
152 "I would just ask, however,... [w]hether they meet in darkness; whether they
hide their names, their numbers, and their doings; whether they shut their doors to admit
information?" 4 Annals of Cong 923 (Nov 26, 1794). See also 4 Annals of Cong 902 (Nov
24, 1794) (Rep William Smith). "[I1s there no other place," Giles asked in reply, "where
people bolt their doors, and vote in the dark? Is there not a branch of our Legislature
which transacts its business in this way?" 4 Annals of Cong 919 (Nov 26, 1794). The
Senate, the reader will recall, still had not admitted the public to its deliberations.
" Political societies, he argued, served as "a substitute for representation"; when they
acted in the name of those who were not members, they committed "an usurpation"; the
result was "the power of the few over the many"; "[i]f the clubs prevail, they will be the
Government." 4 Annals of Cong 923, 925 (Nov 26, 1794). See also 4 Annals of Cong 910
(Nov 25, 1794) (Rep Dexter) ("Such societies are proper in a country where Government is
despotic, but it is improper that such societies should exist in a free country like the
United States."). For a discussion of this point of view see Sharp, American Politics in the
Early Republic at 100-03 (cited in note 1).
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And we learn, with the greatest concern, that any misrepre-
sentations whatever, of the Government and its proceedings,
either by individuals or combinations of men, should have
been made, and so far credited as to foment the flagrant
outrage which has been committed on the laws.M
There was no denunciation of the Democratic Societies as such,
by name or by innuendo; there was no disparagement of the right
to assemble--"concern" over "misrepresentations" is not necessar-
ily inconsistent with the right to criticize the government. But
the gulf between the developing parties in Congress was deeper
and more hostile than ever, and it was clear that some members
had a pretty narrow view of what the First Amendment meant
by freedom of speech.
V. CITIZENSHIP
Congress had passed a hospitable naturalization law in
1790."55 It passed a more niggardly one in 1795.156
The new statute clarified two important points left unan-
swered in 1790. First, it mooted the controversy over whether
Congress's naturalization power was exclusive, as its purpose
seemed to suggest,'57 by providing that citizenship could be ac-
quired only as provided in the act itself.5 ' The uncontested as-
sumption seemed to be that exclusivity was necessary and proper
to the exercise of congressional authority to provide a "uniform"
rule, as it clearly was.
The second clarification made it explicit that naturalization
proceedings could be brought in federal as well as state
courts.5 9 It was surely appropriate that some federal agency
share the burden of passing upon applications for national citi-
zenship. To the twentieth-century observer, it is less obvious that
that agency should be the courts. As under the pension law,
which the courts had struck down for other reasons, 6 ' the typi-
"u 4 Annals of Cong 947 (Nov 28, 1794).
' Act of Mar 26, 1790, 1 Stat 103. See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 822-25 (cited in
note 6).
15 Act of Jan 29, 1795, 1 Stat 414.
157 See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 822 n 279 (cited in note 6).
i Act of Jan 29, 1795 § 1, 1 Stat at 414.
"' Id. The earlier statute had ambiguously provided for application to "any common
law court of record, in any one of [several] states." Act of Mar 26, 1790 § 1, 1 Stat at 103.
See also Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 824-25 (cited in note 6).
" See Hayburn's Case, 2 US (2 Dall) 409, 410-14 n a (1792) (striking down the
pension law primarily because the legislature could not assign nonjudicial duties to the
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cal proceeding was ex parte; unless the Government chose to
oppose a particular application-which the 1795 statute did not
say it had the right to do--it was difficult to see how there was a
"case" or "controversy" of the adversarial nature that we have
come to understand to be required by Article III."'1 There is no
suggestion in the Annals that anyone in Congress shared this
understanding in 1795.
But the main point of the new statute was to make it more
difficult to become a citizen.'62 Congress extended the two-year
residence requirement to five years. It also required the applicant
to announce his intention to become a citizen three years in ad-
vance and to renounce allegiance to his former sovereign."
More interesting to the constitutional scholar were two additional
restrictions: the applicant was required to disclaim any foreign
title or order of nobility, and to have "behaved as a man of good
moral character, attached to the principles of the constitution of
the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happi-
ness of the same.""
The latter condition enjoyed broad support. Sedgwick had
begun the debate by warning of the perils of unchecked immigra-
tion from despotic and war-torn Europe: people who had not been
brought up in a republic could not be expected to absorb its vir-
tues overnight, and people from nations at war with one another
could not be expected to get along.6 ' Giles, from the opposite
judiciary).
161 Justice Brandeis would have to strain mightily to find a case or controversy when
the question finally reached the Supreme Court a century and a quarter later. See Tutun
v United States, 270 US 568 (1926); Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Sec-
ond Century at 182-83 (cited in note 28); Wheeler, 1973 S Ct Rev at 134 n 61 (cited in
note 56).
1"2 Dexter, in a speech badly truncated in the Annals, is said to have "described the
present easy access to citizenship as dangerous and insufficient to prevent improper per-
sons from being incorporated with the American people." Frank George Franklin, The
Legislative History of Naturalization in the United States: From the Revolutionary War to
1861 49 (Chicago 1906). Fears of unsuitable immigrants had been increased by the flood
of refugees from the wars that broke out in the wake of the French Revolution. See the
remarks of Representative Sedgwick noted in the text accompanying note 165; James H.
Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship 1608-1870 239-40 (North Carolina
1978).
1.. Act of Jan 29, 1795 § 1, 1 Stat at 414. The first two of these requirements, but not
the third, were made inapplicable to persons already residing in the United States. Id § 2,
1 Stat at 415.
'- Id § 1, 1 Stat at 414. The 1790 act had required only that the applicant be "of good
character" and swear "to support the constitution of the United States." Act of Mar 26,
1790 § 1, 1 Stat at 103.
" 4 Annals of Cong 1005-09 (Dec 22, 1794).
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end of the political spectrum, moved to require proof that the ap-
plicant was "attached to a Republican form of Government," in
order "to prevent those poisonous communications from Europe,
of which gentlemen were so much afraid."6 ' There was much
quibbling over the word "Republican," which had been appropri-
ated by Madison and Jefferson's party; there was some objection
to requiring the testimony of two witnesses, which was alleged to
impose an undue burden on the poor.6 7 Only Madison called
attention to the more fundamental problem:
It [is] hard to make a man swear that he prefer[s] the Con-
stitution of the United States, or to give any general opinion,
because he may, in his own private judgment, think Monar-
chy or Aristocracy better and yet be honestly determined to
support this Government as he finds it. 6 '
He did not put this objection on constitutional grounds, but the
bitter lessons of the McCarthy period enable us to do so: a test of
political orthodoxy for dispensing government benefits impinges
on values protected by the First Amendment.'69
Possibly in response to Madison's criticism, the requirement
of actual endorsement of constitutional principles was replaced
by the more innocuous insistence on a finding that the applicant
had behaved like a person attached to our Constitu-
tion'9m--which was perhaps to say only that he must have been
a law-abiding denizen. The doctrinal foundation for a constitu-
tional attack on the original political test, moreover, was laid
when the irrepressible Giles moved to add the requirement that
the applicant renounce any preexisting titles.' 7'
William Smith of South Carolina protested that Congress
had no power to deprive anyone of his titles. 72 Dexter added
16 4 Annals of Cong 1021 (Dec 26, 1794).
' Id at 1021-23.
16 Id at 1022-23.
1 See, for example, Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589 (1967) (State universi-
ty procedure requiring teachers to answer questions regarding past or present communist
activities as condition of employment violates First Amendment.); Currie, Constitution in
the Supreme Court: The Second Century at 355-58 (cited in note 28); Harry Kalven, Jr., A
Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America 301-14 (Harper & Row 1988). The
tension was highlighted by Giles's frank admission that the purpose of his proposal was to
keep out "poisonous communications." 4 Annals of Cong 1021 (Dec 26, 1794). See text
accompanying note 166.
17o See text accompanying note 164.
4 Annals of Cong 1030 (Dec 31, 1794).
172 Id at 1030-31.
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the analogy that constitutionalized Madison's objection to a polit-
ical test: "An alien might as well be obliged to make a renuncia-
tion of his connexions with the Jacobin club. The one was fully as
abhorrent to the Constitution as the other."73 Giles, echoed by
John Page of Virginia, gave the response later made familiar by
Justice Holmes: no one was being deprived of anything; the no-
bleman could keep his title by not becoming a citizen. 74
Dexter threw the House into an uproar by blandly announc-
ing that he would be happy to vote for the proposal if Giles would
agree to an amendment requiring the applicant to renounce not
only his titles but also his slaves.'75 Giles affected injury: "He
was sorry to see slavery made a jest of in that House .... It had
no proper connexion with the subject before the House."76 John
Heath of Virginia, who seldom spoke, swallowed the bait in a
single gulp: since Congress could not forbid the importation of
slaves, it could not require their renunciation as a condition of
citizenship.77 That, of course, was precisely Dexter's point:
3 Id at 1031.
174 Id at 1034 (Rep Giles); id at 1035 (Rep Page); McAuliffe v Mayor of New Bedford,
155 Mass 216, 29 NE 517, 517 (1892) (Holmes) ("The petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."). Madison, who
appeared to perceive the dangers of this approach, took a different tack that served to
distinguish the Jacobin example: it was proper to require renunciation of hereditary titles
because they were "proscribed by the Constitution." 4 Annals of Cong 1035 (Jan 1, 1795).
See also id at 1039 (Rep Scott). Uriah Tracy of Connecticut set Madison straight: while
Article I, § 9 forbade the United States to grant titles and federal officers to accept them,
nothing in the Constitution prevented private citizens from receiving foreign titles, much
less retaining those they had previously possessed. 4 Annals of Cong 1053 (Jan 2, 1795).
"' 4 Annals of Cong 1039 (Jan 1, 1795). Thatcher twisted the knife by moving, as a
second amendment, "and that he never will possess them." Id.
17 Id. Similarly, when an unidentified member of the House suggested dropping the
requirement that the militia be limited to white persons he was greeted with a cold
reminder of political correctness: "[Tihe subject was obviously and extremely improper for
public discussion." 4 Annals of Cong 1234 (Feb 17, 1795). Yet it was the Third Congress
that, in response to yet another petition from the Quakers, 4 Annals of Cong 249 (Jan 20,
1794), forbade sailing from the United States for the purpose of exporting slaves or of
transporting inhabitants of one foreign country into slavery in another. Act of Mar 22,
1794, 1 Stat 347. Neither of these provisions fell within the twenty-year moratorium on
congressional powers contained in Article I, § 9, and Congress evidently surmounted any
doubts as to whether such provisions came within the commerce power, as the House had
concluded in 1790. See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 792-94 (cited in note 6). The Annals re-
port no debate on these interesting provisions.
" 4 Annals of Cong 1040 (Jan 1, 1795). See also 4 Annals of Cong 1042 (Jan 2, 1795)
(Rep McDowell). McDowell made a second and distinct argument against requiring
renunciation of slaves: "What right had the House to say to a particular class of people,
you shall not have that kind of property which other people have?" Id at 1042-43. He
seemed to be suggesting that "naturalization" implied that new citizens, like new "states"
under the Northwest Ordinance and the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article IV, § 3,
were to be admitted on an equal footing with old ones. See Coyle v Smith, 221 US 559
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since Congress could not strip individuals of their titles directly,
it could not do so by indirection.
Dexter's conclusion was not unavoidable; some discretion as
to who is an acceptable member of the community is obviously
implicit in the authority to enact a uniform naturalization rule.
Yet Dexter's reminder that this discretion must be limited if it
was not to impinge on individual or state rights was welcome.
The House had already debated the difficult problem of unconsti-
tutional conditions in 1791, when it voted down a proposal to
limit the political activities of revenue officers. 78 The Third
Congress decreed that new citizens must renounce their titles but
not their slaves; 9 its successors would have ample opportuni-
ties to wrestle with the analogous question of what conditions
could permissibly be attached to federal grants8 ° or to the ad-
mission of new states.181
(1911); Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 842 (cited in note 6). The argument is quite plausible:
there is no reason to think the Framers would have looked kindly on the prospect of
second-class citizens. The same principle of equality may help to explain the cold shoulder
the House had given in 1790 to the suggestion that new citizens be denied the right to
hold public office. See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 823 (cited in note 6); Kettner, Develop-
ment of American Citizenship at 237 (cited in note 162) ("Congress generally agreed [in
1790] that the Constitution barred attempts to establish gradations of rights among the
mass of citizens .... ."). See also 4 Annals of Cong 1026-27 (Dec 29, 1794) (Rep Sedgwick)
(hoping but doubting that Congress could find some way to permit aliens to hold property
without giving them the right to vote).
178 See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 787 (cited in note 6).
179 See Act of Jan 29, 1795 § 1, 1 Stat at 414; 4 Annals of Cong 1057 (Jan 2, 1795).
188 See United States v Butler, 297 US 1 (1936) (holding unconstitutional an act in-
tended to reduce agricultural surpluses by subsidizing farmers who agreed to limit pro-
duction); South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203 (1987) (upholding federal law directing gov-
ernment to withhold highway funds from states with minimum drinking age under
twenty-one); Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century at 227-31
(cited in note 28).
181 See, for example, the extensive debates leading to the Missouri Compromise, 35
Annals of Cong 467-69 (Mar 2, 1820); 36 Annals of Cong 1576-88 (Mar 2, 1820). Proposals
to require state or congressional consent to restore U.S. citizenship to those who had re-
nounced it (as Loyalists had done during the Revolution, and others had done in 1793 in
order to fight for France without running afoul of the neutrality laws) produced a variety
of constitutional objections. Madison, in a preview of the Dred Scott case, argued that
Congress had no power to readmit American citizens, since only "aliens" could be natural-
ized. 4 Annals of Cong 1027 (Dec 29, 1794). See Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393
(1856). In denying that expatriates were "aliens," Madison may have assumed, as Dexter
asserted, that citizens could not renounce their allegiance at all; Murray reminded the
House that the country had been built on the contrary principle. 4 Annals of Cong 1028
(Dec 30, 1794). The proposal to require special legislation was questioned on various
grounds: mingling of federal and state authority, interference with exclusive federal and
state prerogatives, and violation of the apparent requirement that naturalization laws be
uniform. 4 Annals of Cong 1005 (Dec 22, 1794) (Rep Giles). It was not enacted.
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VI. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
For the second time in two years a judicial interpretation of
the Constitution commanded congressional attention. When the
Justices had struck down the pension law in Hayburn's Case,'
Congress had amended the statute.'83 When the Supreme Court
held in Chisholm v Georgia that one state could be sued by the
citizens of another," Congress decided it was the Constitution
that needed amending.
The text of Article III seemed to support the Chisholm deci-
sion: "The Judicial Power shall extend to ... Controver-
sies ... between a State and Citizens of another State.. .. ""
Suits against unconsenting sovereigns, however, were unknown
when the Constitution was written, and prominent framers from
Madison to Marshall had assured the country that nothing in
Article III would permit the states to be sued.18 6
The decision, as one commentator has written, "fell upon the
country with a profound shock."87 Newspapers representing a
rainbow of opinion protested what they viewed as an unexpected
blow to state sovereignty." Others spoke more concretely of
prospective raids on state treasuries.'89 Georgia's House of Rep-
resentatives passed a bill providing that anyone attempting to
execute process in the Chisholm case should be "guilty of felony
and shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy, by being
hanged."90
The adverse reaction was not universal. 9' But other state
legislatures called for a constitutional amendment to reverse the
Court's decision,'92 and one was introduced in the House the
1- 2 US (2 Dall) 409, 410-14 n a (1792).
'3 Act of Feb 28, 1793, 1 Stat 324.
4 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793). See Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First
Hundred Years at 14-20 (cited in note 56).
1 US Const, Art II, § 2, cl 1.
' Jonathan Elliot, 3 The Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 533
(Taylor & Maury 1854) (Madison); id at 555 (Marshall). See also Federalist 81 (Hamilton),
in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 487-88 (cited in note 34).
" See Warren, 1 Supreme Court in United States History at 96 (cited in note 44).
"" Id at 96-98.
1 Id at 99.
ISO Id at 100-01.
... See generally Maeva Marcus and Natalie Wexler, Suits Against States: Diversity of
Opinion in the 1790s, 1993 J S Ct Hist 73 (noting, among other things, that Maryland had
not protested when it was sued, before Chisholm, in the Supreme Court).
2 The Massachusetts legislature, for example, finding Chisholm "repugnant to the
first principles of a federal government," requested the state's Representatives and in-
structed its Senators to take all necessary steps to bring about an amendment that would
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day after Chisholm was announced.'93 Amendment was one of
the Senate's first priorities when Congress reconvened in Decem-
ber 1793, and by mid-March the proposal was on its way to the
states.'" President Adams proclaimed its ratification in
1798.'9' Thenceforth, said the Eleventh Amendment, "the Judi-
cial power of the United States sh[ould] not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 6
The Annals report no debate on the amendment. Each House
discussed and endorsed it in a single day, almost without dis-
sent.1 7 It is plain that just about everybody in Congress agreed
that the Supreme Court had misread the Constitution.9 8
Notwithstanding this apparent consensus, there were three
revealing attempts to water down the proposal. An unidentified
Senator moved to limit the reach of the amendment so that it
would bar only suits in which "the cause of action shall have
arisen before the ratification of the amendment." 99 An uniden-
tified Representative moved to close the federal courts only
"[w]here such State shall have previously made provision in their
"remove any clause or article of the said Constitution, which can be construed to imply or
justify a decision, that, a State is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or
individuals in any Court of the United States." Syrett, et al, eds, 15 The Papers of Alexan-
der Hamilton at 313-14 n 3 (cited in note 4). See also Goebel, 1 History of the Supreme
Court at 734-36 (cited in note 60).
"' See Warren, 1 Supreme Court in United States History at 101 (cited in note 44).
The amendment was proposed in the Senate on January 2, 1794, in the terms in
which it was adopted. It passed the Senate January 14 and the House March 4; a joint
resolution of March 12 requested that the President forward the proposal to the states.
See 4 Annals of Cong 25, 30, 477, 499 (Jan 2, 14, 1794; Mar 4, 12, 1794); Amendment of
the Constitution to prevent suits against States, 1 Stat 402 (1794). As in the case of the
twelve amendments that had been proposed in 1789, neither Congress nor the President
suggested that proposed amendments had to be presented for presidential approval or
veto under Article I, § 7. See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 856-57 (cited in note 6);
Hollingsworth v Virginia, 3 US (3 Dall) 378 (1798); Currie, Constitution in the Supreme
Court: The First Hundred Years at 20-23 (cited in note 56).
19 John Adams, Special Message to the Senate and House, in Richardson, ed, 1
Messages and Papers of the Presidents at 260 (cited in note 10). For the curiously careless
manner in which ratifications were recorded and proclaimed, see Warren, 1 Supreme
Court in United States History at 101-02 n 2 (cited in note 44).
"' US Const, Amend XI.
... The Senate vote was twenty-three to two, the House vote eighty-one to nine. See 4
Annals of Cong 30-31, 477-78 (Jan 14, 1794; Mar 4, 1794).
"' See also Kent, 1 Commentaries at 415 (cited in note 54). Story, writing like Kent a
generation and a half later, seemed to think Chisholm had been rightly decided. Story, 3
Commentaries § 1677 at 547-48 (cited in note 39).
" 4 Annals of Cong 30 (Jan 14, 1794).
1996] The Constitution in Congress
own Courts, whereby such suit may be prosecuted to effect."200
Albert Gallatin, sitting briefly as a Pennsylvania Senator before
succeeding Madison as opposition leader in the House,20' moved
to make an exception permitting states to be sued "in cases aris-
ing under treaties made under the authority of the United
States."2 2
All three of these limiting proposals were rejected.0 3 Con-
gress was unwilling to permit suits against states on future caus-
es of action, or in cases in which no other forum was available, or
2C, 4 Annals of Cong 476 (Mar 4, 1794).
201 Born in Switzerland, Gallatin had come to the United States in 1780, engaged in
farming, fought in the Revolution, taught French at Harvard, and taken an oath of
allegiance to Virginia in 1785. When named to the Senate in 1793, he was challenged and
unseated (after the Senate had taken action on the proposed amendment) on the ground
that he had not been nine years a citizen of the United States, as Article I, § 3 required.
See 4 Annals of Cong 19, 47-62 (Dec 11, 1793; Feb 20-28, 1794). Like the case of William
Smith, see Currie, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 173-74 (cited in note 9), Gallatin's exclu-
sion raised difficult questions of defining citizenship before the new Constitution took
effect. As in Smith's case, the result was inconclusive; Gallatin lost by an unexplained
vote of fourteen to twelve that appeared to be on what we would now call party lines. 4
Annals of Cong 57 (Feb 28, 1794). Raymond Walters, Jr., Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian
Financier and Diplomat 59-63 (Macmillan 1957). He was elected to the House as a mem-
ber of the Fourth Congress and served there until he became Secretary of the Treasury in
1801. See Kettner, Development of American Citizenship at 232-35 (cited in note 162).
Two contests over House elections during the Third Congress made clear that, in
exercising its responsibility to judge the elections of its members, the House was generally
to apply state law. See 4 Annals of Cong 145-47, 148, 442-44, 453-55 (Dec 20, 24, 1793;
Feb 10, 14, 1794); Matthew St. Clair Clarke and David A. Hall, Cases of Contested Elec-
tions in Congress 69-77 (Gales & Seaton 1834). As a general matter there was nothing
surprising in this conclusion, since, as was pointed out in debate, Article I, § 4 expressly
provided that state law should regulate the "times, places and manner" of holding con-
gressional elections until Congress legislated a federal rule. 4 Annals of Cong 147 (Dec 20,
1793). The Delaware law that the House applied in the second case, however, required
voters to pick two candidates for Representative, one of whom resided outside their own
county. See also Article II, § 1, which makes an analogous provision for presidential
elections. Whether the Residence Clause related to the "manner" of holding elections or to
the qualifications of the candidate, and whether the states had authority to add to the
qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence prescribed in Article I, § 2, the House
apparently did not discuss.
The Annals also report a brief contretemps over the seating of one Gabriel Duvall,
who had presented credentials as a Representative from Maryland in the place of John
Francis Mercer, whose election had created a controversy only two years before. See 4
Annals of Cong 742 (May 31, 1794); 3 Annals of Cong 205-07 (Nov 22, 1791). Once a
committee report was read finding that Mercer had resigned, Duvall was awarded his
seat, which he occupied for the next sixteen months without ever opening his
mouth-suggesting that his brief service in the House was a fertile training ground for
the exemplary record of insignificance he was to compile in the twenty-five years he spent
on the Supreme Court. See 4 Annals of Cong 873-75 (Nov 11, 1794); David P. Currie, The
Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U Chi L Rev 466 (1983).
" See 4 Annals of Cong 30 (Jan 14, 1794).
... Id; 4 Annals of Cong 476 (Mar 4, 1794).
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even in cases arising under treaties. Only a handful of mem-
bers-including Gallatin and Boudinot, but not Madison or even
Ames-thought the Constitution should provide a mechanism to
ensure that the states paid their debts.
Sovereign immunity is not fashionable today. Nor is it an
attractive principle. When governments commit wrongs, they
ought to be brought to book. When they violate federal rights, or
the rights of citizens of other states or nations, they ought to be
suable in federal court. But that was neither the view of the
Third Congress nor the view of the state legislatures that ap-
proved its proposal.
The fate of Gallatin's modest request not to leave our foreign
relations at the mercy of individual states should put to rest the
modern heresy that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to
federal-question cases.2 One can imagine a scenario in which a
motion to exempt treaty cases is voted down as unnecessary
because the amendment itself is inapplicable to cases arising
under federal law. But the language of the actual amendment is
not conducive to such an interpretation; it flatly bars "any suit in
law or equity" by diverse plaintiffs against a state. More impor-
tant, the historical context belies any attempt at wishful think-
ing: as the prompt rejection of all ameliorating alterations shows,
Congress was in no mood to permit any federal suit against a
state by a citizen of another state or of a foreign country.
VII. THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
On April 3, 1794, President Washington signed into law an
obscure little bill transferring the jurisdiction of the United
States District Court for New Hampshire to the Circuit Court of
that district, "until the end of the next session of Congress, or
until a new district judge be appointed in that district, and no
4 The trouble started with Justice Brennan's unfortunate dissenting opinion in
Employees v Dep't of Public Health and Welfare of Missouri, 411 US 279, 315-21 (1973),
attacking the well-settled proposition (see Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 10 (1890)) that
the Arising Under Clause of Article III, § 2 contained an implied exception for suits
against states. The argument was soon extended to the point of contending that federal-
question cases were not barred even when they fell within the explicit terms of the
Eleventh Amendment. See Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 290-91
(1985) (Brennan, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissenting). For a defense of
Hans, see Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century at 7-9 (cited in
note 28).
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longer.""5 This simple measure dealt a grave setback to the in-
dependence of the judiciary.
If the office of District Judge for New Hampshire had been
vacant, we might have relegated the incident to a footnote as an
example of ingenuity in ensuring that federal judicial business
not be interrupted-wondering aloud why the President did not
see that the vacancy was filled and whether, in assigning juris-
diction to the Circuit Court, Congress was not effectively usurp-
ing the power of appointment. But the office was not vacant. It
had been occupied since 1789 by one John Sullivan, who for some
time had been unable to perform his judicial duties.
John Sullivan was a war hero. Fighting beside Washington
at battles from Long Island to Brandywine, he had risen to the
rank of Major-General. When the Revolution was over he served
in the Confederation Congress and as President (Governor) of
New Hampshire. He was a leader in the struggle to ratify the
Philadelphia Constitution0 6 and "a logical choice" for appoint-
ment as the state's first federal judge2 7 -"the only position in
the appointment of the President," one biographer ominously ob-
served, "his health permitted him to accept."0 '
At the time of his appointment Sullivan was still President
of New Hampshire, and he did not immediately resign. The state
legislature protested that it was improper for him to hold both
offices at once, but did nothing.0 9 The federal Constitution
makes clear that federal judges cannot simultaneously be mem-
bers of Congress;210 it says nothing about holding federal and
state offices at the same time. One is tempted to mumble some-
thing about the spirit of the Constitution.
Sullivan resigned his state office in June 1790. It was not
until a year later that the first case came before his federal court.
Even then he was "not... particularly occupied by his judicial
2C Act of Apr 3, 1794 §§ 1, 3, 1 Stat 352, 353. Section 2 of the Act transferred the non-
judicial duties of the District Judge under the latest version of the Pension Act, see
Currie, 90 Nw U L Rev (cited in note 9), to the federal district attorney. Act of Apr 3,
1794 § 2, 1 Stat at 353.
" See Charles P. Whittemore, A General of the Revolution: John Sullivan of New
Hampshire 207-20, 228 (Columbia 1961); Thomas C. Amory, The Military Services and
Public Life of Major-General John Sullivan, of the American Revolutionary Army 229-33
(Wiggin & Lunt 1868).
.. Whittemore, General of the Revolution at 222 (cited in note 206).
.. Amory, Military Services and Public Life at 241 (cited in note 206).
" Whittemore, General of the Revolution at 223 (cited in note 206).
210 US Const, Art I, § 6, cl 2.
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duties," and by 1792 he had reached such a state of drunkenness
and senility that he was incapable of sitting at all.21'
At the urging of his "friends," Sullivan elected not to resign.
Some person "over eager for the advancement of a friend" sug-
gested that Washington do something about Sullivan; the Presi-
dent is said to have replied that "there was no man in the coun-
try he would not sooner remove than General Sullivan." "
The truth of the matter was that the Framers had arguably
made a mistake: in their commendable zeal to ensure an inde-
pendent judicial branch,213 they had neglected to provide any
tools for removing an incompetent judge.
Impeachment, of course, required proof of "high Crimes [or]
Misdemeanors," not mere inability to fulfill one's duties. 4 Lat-
er judges who approached Sullivan's lamentable condition were
coaxed off the bench by their colleagues,215 though they did not
always react with grace.216 But there was no way of making
them go, and President Washington was unwilling even to try.
It was in this pitiful state of affairs that a House committee
was charged with the task of devising a remedy in the event of
the incapacity of a federal judge.1 7 The result we know already:
a bill to transfer Sullivan's duties to the Circuit Court,1 8 which
was adopted without recorded debate.2 9
The crisis was real, the temptation great, the benefit clear:
federal judicial business could once again be done in New Hamp-
shire. The cost was greater, the action unforgivable: all Congress
had to do to rid itself of a judge of whose opinions it disapproved
211 See Whittemore, General of the Revolution at 223-24 (cited in note 206).
212 Amory, Military Service and Public Life at 245 (cited in note 206).
211 See Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 464-72
(cited in note 34).
214 US Const, Art II, § 4.
21" Holmes wrote his letter of resignation on the day Chief Justice Hughes suggested
it was time to hang up his robe. Sheldon M. Novick, Honorable Justice: The Life of Oliver
Wendell Holmes 375 (Little, Brown 1989).
216 Justice Field, when reminded by his executioner that thirty years before he had
been chosen to give the fatal word to Justice Grier, observed that he had never done a
dirtier day's work in his life. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United
States: Its Foundation, Methods and Achievements: An Interpretation 76 (Columbia 1928).
Justice Douglas is said to have asserted the right to participate in deciding cases after he
had been persuaded to retire. James F. Simon, Independent Journey: The Life of William
0. Douglas 452-53 (Harper 1980).
21 See 4 Annals of Cong 457-58, 468-69 (Feb 19, 27, 1794).
218 See 4 Annals of Cong 482 (Mar 6, 1794).
219 4 Annals of Cong 528 (Mar 24-25, 1794) (noting that "some time" was spent on the
proposition in the Committee of the Whole but reporting nothing of what was said). The
yeas and nays were not taken.
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was transfer his jurisdiction to another court. It is true that,
since Article III vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court
and "such inferior Courts as the Congress may, from time to
time, ordain and establish," the legislature has a good deal of
discretion in defining the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts.22 ° But unbridled legislative authority to transfer cases
from one court to another makes a mockery of the constitutional
guarantee that federal judges hold office "during good
Behaviour."221
The obvious remedy was to amend the Impeachment Clause
to make incapacity a basis for the removal of a federal judge.
After all, only a month had passed since Congress had proposed
another constitutional amendment to correct a perceived deficien-
cy in the jurisdictional provisions of Article III.2 To be sure, a
willful House and Senate could always cook up "incapacity"
where none existed;2  but they could cook up "high crimes and
misdemeanors" too, as they demonstrated in removing Sullivan's
unhappy successor in 1804.224 The process by which Congress
dealt with Sullivan in 1794 was subject to greater abuse than
any plausible impeachment standard, for no finding of miscon-
duct or even inadequacy-and no two-thirds vote of the Sen-
ate-was necessary to transfer jurisdiction from one court to
another.
Perhaps the most charitable explanation for Congress's un-
fortunate action is that time was of the essence: judicial business
in New Hampshire could not comfortably await ratification by
three-fourths of the states. It seems not to have occurred to Con-
gress in 1794, as it later would, that the good behavior standard
See Sheldon v Sill, 49 US (8 How) 441, 448-49 (1850) ("[Hlaving a right to pre-
scribe [federal jurisdiction], Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdic-
tion of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no juris-
diction but such as the statute confers.").
' US Const, Art III, § 1.
See text accompanying notes 193-98.
As Story observed: "An attempt to fix the boundary between the region of ability
and inability would much oftener give rise to personal, or party attachments and hostili-
ties, than advance the interests of justice, or the public good. And instances of absolute
imbecility would be too rare to justify the introduction of so dangerous a provision." Story,
3 Commentaries § 1619 at 486 (cited in note 39). The first sentence of this passage is
taken almost verbatim from Federalist 79 (Hamilton), in Rossiter. ed, The Federalist
Papers at 472. In place of the second, Hamilton had written, less convincingly, that
"insanity without any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a vir-
tual disqualification." Id at 474.
" See Eleanore Bushnell, Crimes, Follies, and Misfortunes: The Federal Impeachment
Trials 43-55 (Illinois 1992) (describing the successful impeachment of the equally deficient
and alcoholic Judge Pickering, also of the luckless District of New Hampshire).
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might permit the creation of statutory machinery for circumvent-
ing an incompetent judge by the action of his judicial
peers225 a procedure that, while diminishing the independence
of the individual judge, does no violence to the central principle
that the judiciary must be free from interference by the other
branches it is expected to police.
VIII. THE SOUTHWEST DELEGATE
When the Third Congress convened for the second time in
Philadelphia in November 1794, James White laid before the
House his credentials as "Representative of the Territory of the
United States South of the river Ohio, in the Congress of the
United States."226 He was eventually seated, but only after a
heated debate that went to the very nature of the House.
It was Zephaniah Swift, a new member from Connecticut,
who raised the objection:
The Constitution has made no provision for such a member
as this person is intended to be. If we can admit a Delegate
to Congress or a member of the House of Representatives,
we may with equal propriety admit a stranger from any
quarter of the world.22 '
Article I, § 2 seemed to support him: "The House of Representa-
tives shall be composed of members chosen... by the people of
the several States."228
There were two arguments for seating the gentleman from
the Southwest Territory, and William Smith espoused them both.
First, he said, Mr. White was entitled to a seat "by the terms of
an express compact with the people."229 What that meant was
spelled out in the report of an ad hoc committee. 2" The
Northwest Ordinance had promised the residents of the Territory
2 See 28 USC § 372(c) (1988 & Supp 1993); Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or
Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis, 142 U Pa L Rev 209, 232-33 (1993);
Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U Pa L Rev 243, 259-
76 (1993). See also 28 USC § 372(b) (1988) (authorizing appointment of an additional
judge, not to be replaced after the need disappears, in case a disabled judge declines to
retire).
226 4 Annals of Cong 873 (Nov 11, 1794).
4 Annals of Cong 884 (Nov 17, 1794).
Moreover, said Swift, if White was a member he could not be denied the right to
vote, as had been proposed. The Constitution, he seemed to be saying, did not envision
two distinct classes of members. Id.
Id at 885. See also id at 886 (Rep Dayton); id at 887 (Rep Baldwin).
4 Annals of Cong 888-89 (Nov 18, 1794).
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Northwest of the Ohio, once they established a legislature, the
right to send "a delegate to Congress,... with a right of debat-
ing, but not of voting."231 After the new Constitution took effect,
Congress had passed a statute giving this ordinance "[f]ull ef-
fect."232 In conformity with the Act whereby North Carolina
ceded to the United States the area that became the Southwest
Territory,233 the Act of Congress establishing that territory
granted its inhabitants "all the privileges, benefits, and advan-
tages" set forth in the Northwest Ordinance.2"
Of course no "compact" or Act of Congress could authorize
what the Constitution forbade, and Article I seemed pretty clear
that only the people of the states were entitled to representation
in Congress. As far as the Northwest Territory was concerned,
the promise in the Ordinance could plausibly be viewed as an
engagement "entered into before [ ] the adoption of this Constitu-
tion" and thus, under Article VI, "as valid ... under this Consti-
tution, as under the Confederation. " " 5 It is true that the entire
Northwest Ordinance seemed to be unauthorized by the Articles
of Confederation,236 but it was generally accepted as valid; and
thus there was a respectable argument that Article VI required
Congress to seat a delegate sent by the Northwest Territory.
No delegate from that territory, however, appeared until
1799, when young William Henry Harrison presented his cre-
dentials to the Sixth Congress.3 7 James White came from the
1 Stat 50, 52 n a (1789).
. 2 Id at 51.
See Act of Apr 2, 1790, 1 Stat 106, 108.
Act of May 26, 1790 § 1, 1 Stat 123, 123. See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 842-45
(cited in note 6). Some difficulty was engendered by the fact that the Ordinance provided
for a delegate to "Congress," which had originally meant the Congress of the Confedera-
tion. As Swift pointed out, the House of Representatives was not Congress. Boudinot
contended that, since White had been elected by the territorial legislature, his proper
place was in the Senate; Murray suggested that as a delegate to "Congress" he might be
"entitled to a seat in both Houses." 4 Annals of Cong 884, 886 (Nov 7, 1794).
US Const, Art VI.
See Currie, 61 U Chi L Rev at 842 (cited in note 6).
Under the terms of the Ordinance, the delegate was to be chosen by the territorial
legislature, which was not to be elected until the territory had a population of five thou-
sand free adult males. Settlement was retarded by repeated Indian depredations until
General Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers in 1794 and the evacuation of the forts held by
the British in defiance of the Peace Treaty, which occurred only after the Jay Treaty was
approved in 1795. Consequently the population threshold was not reached until 1798, and
the legislature first met in 1799. See Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism at 436-39
(cited in note 1); Charles B. Galbreath, 1 History of Ohio 197-99 (American Historical
Society 1925); Dorothy Burne Goebel, William Henry Harrison: A Political Biography 41-
42 (Indiana Historical Bureau 1926); Robert M. Taylor, Jr., ed, The Northwest Ordinance
1787: A Bicentennial Handbook 52 (Indiana Historical Society 1987).
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Southwest Territory, which had not been organized until 1790. It
had no "engagement" antedating the Constitution and thus could
derive no comfort from Article VI.
The argument based on the Northwest Ordinance therefore
boiled down to an argument based on tradition, however brief. If
the seating of a nonvoting territorial delegate was consistent
with the provision of the Articles of Confederation for selection of
congressional delegates "in such manner as the legislature of
each State shall direct,"2 3 it was consistent with Article I, § 2
as well.
Smith's second argument helped to explain how the admis-
sion of a nonvoting delegate could be reconciled with that provi-
sion. The House could admit anyone it liked for purposes of de-
bate; it could admit the Secretary of State."9 Indeed, Dayton
added, the House had often called upon Cabinet officers for ad-
vice.24 In other words, Article I, § 2 spoke only to the method of
selecting "[miembers" of the House; as Madison observed in argu-
ing that White was not required to take the oath prescribed by
Article VI, 4 he was not a "member."242
This argument posed in starkest form the question of what it
meant to be a "member" of Congress. Only the people of the
states were entitled to elect "members," but members engaged in
a variety of activities. They introduced bills, sat on committees,
made motions, spoke in debate, and cast votes. The question was
which of these functions were so central to the operation of the
House that they could be exercised only by representatives cho-
sen in accordance with Article I, § 2.
Voting, it seemed to be agreed, was at the core of the
member's office,2" and the Ordinance had been careful to make
clear that territorial delegates would not have the right to vote.
For voting is the act whereby Congress makes decisions and thus
' Articles of Confederation, Art V, § 1, reprinted in 1 Stat 4 (1778).
4 Annals of Cong 885-86 (Nov 17, 1794) (Rep Smith). See also id at 885 (Rep Giles)
("If the House chose to consult the gallery-a resource for information that he should
never wish to see adopted-they had a right to consult it, or to ask advice from any other
quarter, notwithstanding the assertion of the gentleman from Connecticut [Rep Smith].").
240 Id at 886 (Rep Dayton).
24 The Senators and Representatives shall be "bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution...." See Currie, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 169 (cited in
note 9).
22 4 Annals of Cong 889 (Nov 18, 1794).
243 See id at 890 (Rep Dayton); 4 Annals of Cong 887 (Nov 17, 1794) (Rep Baldwin); id
at 885 (Rep Dexter).
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actually exercises its various powers; anyone who can vote on the
floor of Congress is pretty clearly a "member.""4
Mere speaking, it was argued, was another matter. But when
the House had innocuously asked the Secretary of the Treasury
even for written advice, there had been a storm of protest,"
and in the investigation of General St. Clair, the House had
insisted on hearing from Cabinet members in committee, not
before the House itself.24 To be sure, admitting executive offi-
cers to congressional proceedings raises separation-of-powers con-
cerns not present in the case of the Southwest Delegate.247 But
as Swift pointed out, it was one thing "[tlo admit a person within
the bar for the purpose of consulting him"; it was quite another
to let him "take a permanent seat among the members, for the
purpose of regularly debating."2" Conceding that the Delegate's
position was "infinitely higher" than "that of an advocate allowed
to plead at the bar of the House," Baldwin insisted that it was
nevertheless "extremely short of the situation of a member of
Congress."249
The House agreed with Baldwin; White was seated as a
nonvoting Delegate from the Southwest Territory, in accordance
with the tradition created by the Northwest Ordinance and the
"compact" made when the territory was established."0 Since he
was not a member of the House, White was neither required to
take the oath nor entitled to a member's rights;25' Congress
24 Compare Article 144(2) of the German constitution (since repealed), which satisfied
the Allied concern that West Berlin not be incorporated into West Germany by denying its
representatives in the West German parliament the right to vote. See Currie, Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Germany at 89 (cited in note 19).
... See Currie, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 190 nn 195, 196 (cited in note 9).
246 See 3 Annals of Cong 679-89 (Nov 13, 14, 1792).
247 Compare also the furor over the right of Cabinet officers to introduce bills, which
was heatedly denied. Currie, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 189-90 (cited in note 9).
2" 4 Annals of Cong 888 (Nov 17, 1794).
211 Id at 887. It should not necessarily follow from the conclusion that nonmembers
may be permitted to speak that members may be denied that privilege; membership
implies the right to speak as well as to vote, and it ought to imply a basic equality among
members. See Currie, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 164 n 24 (cited in note 9).
Dexter and Boudinot thought White could not be seated without an Act of Con-
gress; Smith responded that the House "ought to decide their elections on their own
authority," apparently under the power given each House by Article I, § 5 to judge "the
Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members." 4 Annals of Cong 885-86 (Nov
17, 1794). Since the best argument for seating the Delegate was that he was not a "mem-
ber," Smith might better have invoked the further provision of the same Section empower-
ing each House to 'determine the rules of its proceedings." White was seated by a simple
vote of the House, as Smith had suggested. Id at 888.
" See 4 Annals of Cong 889-90 (Nov 18, 1794) (Reps Madison, Smith, Giles, and Day-
ton). A motion to require White to take the oath of office was rejected forty-two to thirty-
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passed a law to provide him with franking privileges, reimburse-
ment of expenses, and a salary,252 all on the theory, one surmis-
es, that these measures were necessary and proper to the opera-
tion of the House. All of this made very good sense,25 and so
long as the Delegate was not given powers so extensive as to
make him effectively a member of the House, it was not impossi-
ble to reconcile it with the Constitution.5 4
IX. THE FLAG
Let us close this survey of the work of the Third Congress by
retracing our steps for a moment to the opening days of its first
session in January 1794, when the House was asked to take a
breather from momentous issues of war and peace to endorse a
Senate bill to add two stars and two stripes to the national flag.
There was some grumbling about the expense of replacing
existing flags, and several members without souls complained
that the matter was too trivial to deserve congressional attention.
Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts protested that if the bill
passed it would not be long before the flag became hopelessly un-
wieldy: "It is very likely, before fifteen years elapse, we shall
consist of twenty States."255 Boudinot pointed out that "the citi-
zens of Vermont and Kentucky... might be affronted" if they
two. Id at 890.
22 Act of Dec 3, 1794, 1 Stat 403.
At one point, Giles moved to limit the Delegate to speaking "upon any question
touching the rights and interests of the people in the Territory," as to which it made most
sense to permit him to speak; but he was happy to withdraw this motion when it attract-
ed no support, saying he had advanced the idea only to make it easier to "get the resolu-
tion through the House." 4 Annals of Cong 887 (Nov 14, 1794).
' This issue arose again in heightened form in 1993, when the House extended to
five Delegates (who had been given the right to vote in standing committees in 1970) the
right also to vote in the Committee of the Whole-except that, if their votes were decisive,
a new vote would be taken without them. The District of Columbia Circuit upheld this
arrangement in Michel v Anderson, 14 F3d 623 (1994), relying largely on the First Con-
gress's endorsement of the provision for a Delegate in the Northwest Ordinance and the
powers exercised by William Henry Harrison (which included making motions and serving
on committees) after his election to that position in 1799. Id at 631. (The more significant
decision to seat the Southwest Delegate, after the constitutional question had been fully
debated, was not mentioned in the opinion.) The court warned, however, that the House
had gone to the limit; similar rights for mayors, or a power to affect the result in the
Committee of the Whole, or a vote of any kind on the floor of the House itself, would be
unconstitutional. Id at 630. These distinctions were all stated as a matter of fiat, and of
course no voting rights followed from the eighteenth-century experience; the prevailing
argument in 1794 was that all the Delegate could do was speak-a right that could be
afforded to anyone.
4 Annals of Cong 164 (Jan 7, 1794).
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were not acknowledged by stars and stripes of their own, and the
bill became law.256 No one questioned Congress's authority to
enact it.
The Constitution says nothing about flags. Congress must
have understood the power to prescribe one to be inherent in
nationhood: every country needs a flag, and the states were in no
position to provide it.25 Tradition supports this interpretation,
as it supported the Third Congress in seating the Southwest
Delegate, for the original flag of thirteen stars and stripes was
adopted in 1777 by the Continental Congress, which had no ex-
press authority in the premises either.25
The banner Congress approved in 1794 would remain our
national emblem until 1818. It was this flag that inspired Francis
Scott Key during the War of 1812, long after its fifteen stars and
stripes had ceased to represent the true state of the Union.25 9
When the number of states reached twenty, Congress was moved
to act once more, and this time it made sure it would never have
to be bothered again. From then on the flag was to consist of
thirteen stripes and twenty stars, with a new star to be added on
the admission of each new state.260 Thus the stars were to rep-
resent all the states of the Union, the stripes the original thir-
teen, and as far as the flag was concerned we could all live happi-
ly ever after.
See id at 165; 4 Annals of Cong 166 (Jan 8, 1794) (reporting passage of bill); Act of
Jan 13, 1794, 1 Stat 341. The House vote was a miserly fifty to forty-two.
' See Frederick C. Hicks, The Flag of the United States 20, 87 (1926):
From the sculptures and paintings on the monuments of Egypt it is evident that the
use of standards and flags was common in the Valley of the Nile thousands of years
before the Christian era.... [Yet t]he use of a particular emblem to symbolize the
authority and unity of a nation is of comparatively modern origin, and has been so
used only during the last three or four centuries.
The German constitution of 1949 prescribes the colors of the national flag, authority to de-
fine other national symbols is understood to be inherent in the central government despite
the fact that, as in the United States, all powers not delegated to the Federation are re-
served to the constituent states. See German Grundgesetz, Arts 22, 30, 70; Theodor
Maunz, et al, 3 Grundgesetz Kommentar, Art 70, Rdnr 46 at 20-21 (Beck 1993).
' See Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed, 8 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-
1789 464 (US GPO 1907); Hicks, The Flag of the United States at 99-100 (cited in note
257). See also id at 101-05 (debunking the legend of Betsy Ross).
" See Hicks, Flag of the United States at 145-46 (cited in note 257).
20 Act of Apr 4, 1818, 3 Stat 415. "A further increase in the number of stripes," wrote
Congressman Hicks, "would have made the width of the flag disproportionate to its
length, unless the stripes were narrowed, and this would have impaired its distinctness."
Hicks, The Flag of the United States at 147 (cited in note 257). Goodhue, the reader will
surely recall, had foreseen this problem in 1794. See text accompanying note 255.
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Most of the Representatives who voted for the new flag in
1794 were associated with the faction that was soon to become
the Republican party. The doctrine of inherent federal authority
that justified their innocent action would come back to haunt
them in 1798.261
But that, like other fascinating stories of the Fourth and
Fifth Congresses, is material for another day.
261 See Aliens Act, 1 Stat at 570; 8 Annals of Cong 1957-59 (June 16, 1798) (Rep
Sewall).
